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ABSTRACT 
The explosive growth in the use of mobile and wireless devices demands a public 
key cryptosystem (PCK) achieving aspects of information security with 
accommodate limitations on power and bandwidth, at the same time keeping with 
high level of security.  
Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) are new generation of public key 
cryptosystems that has smaller key sizes for the same level of security. The 
exponentiation in elliptic curve is the most important operation in ECC, So when 
put the ECC into practice, the major problem is how to enhance the speed of the 
exponentiation. It is thus of great interest to develop algorithms for 
exponentiation, which allow efficient implementations of ECC. 
In this thesis, we improve efficient algorithm for exponentiation on elliptic 
curve defined over Fp in terms of affine coordinates. The algorithm computes 
( )2 1n n2 2 P+Q  directly from random points P and Q on an elliptic curve, without 
computing the intermediate points. Moreover, we apply this algorithm on 
exponentiation on elliptic curve with wMOF and analyze their computational 
complexity. This algorithm can speed the wMOF exponentiation of elliptic curve 
of size 160-bit about (21.7 %) as a result of its implementation with respect to 
affine coordinates. 
 IV
9:;<=ا 
 ل;<=>?ا ABاCDةCFGHا IBJKLMا NOK?PMاوI RKS>B I<TUأ MاWNXY>ح;>X<Mا  Mا م;\=  ]\>Mا C\^_D  IBW\? `\a Wه;\Ta
ت;aJK=<Mا  ومءP>D ea  ةJfMا IBدوAhaI=iMاو M jK>ةCFGHا IBWiMا `a ]M;k ىJ>i<m ظ;X>opا ea. 
 A=DI<TUأ WNXY>Mا  qKk _h_<Mات;N IN^NKهrا PNG  اABAG  أ `a TU ;FM ]>Mاو م;=Mا ح;>X<Mا WNXY>Mا I< ح;>Xa
أ ;<^o stuX_M IBWiMا ىJ>ia . إ ن Hا INK<=Mا IN?qKk  ت;\N_h_<Mا rا I\N^NKه x\هأ I\NK<k  ]\yأ I\<TU WNXY\>Mا  
qKk ت;N_h_<Mا rاIN^NKه jMzM ، ` <OD   A\_k INi\N|WMا IKOY\<Mا }\N~SD Hا j\KD  I\<TU ]\y    \D I\NXNآ I\NK<=Mا eBWi
HاIN\\?،اz\\M نإ  أ `\\a x\\هت;\\a;<>هpا  WBJ\\SD J\\هقW\\ و   <i\\D ت;\\NaزراJ z\\NX_>m أI\\<TUWNXY\\>Mا  q\\Kk 
_h_<Mا ت;NrاN^NKهIKk;Xm NI. 
 zه ]y ،IM;?WMا JS>m ;_<t  Hا I\NK<=Mا ب;i\hM IM;=y IfBW WB IN\? q\Kk_h_<Mا  ت;\Nrا  \N^NKهI q\Kk I\yW=<Mا 
Mاsfh]F>_<Mا ت;NاAorا ماAL>?;m   ةA\a;=><Mا INDر;OBAMا. >i\D   I\NaزراJLMا z\ه eNS ب;i\o2
م
) 2
ن  
 أ +ب (
ةW;~a  `a أ `N>SfU ب  ، ` N>N|اJYk  rا ت;N_h_<Mا qKk IN^NKه نوAmو ، INS\?JMا ط;f_Mا ب;io، و Iy;\r;m
 jMذ qMإ  rا ت;N_h_<Mا qKk IN?Hا INK<=Mا ب;io sGأ `a INaزراJLMا zه }N~S>m ;_<t  I\N^NKه s\NKhDو  
 jKF>i<Mا tJMا ىAa .  \Mد AfM I\NaزراJLMا z\ه z\NX_D A\_k |;\>_Mا  IN\?Hا I\NK<=Mا eBWi\D eNS>i\D ;\FUأ
أ A_k IN^NKهrا ت;N_h_<Mا qKk x^hm ح;>Xa z160- ]MاJo m 21.7. %  
 
 
 V
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I would like to thank Dr. Mohammed Saleh, my supervisor, for his many 
suggestions and constant support during this research.  I would also like to thank 
my committee members, Dr. Wasfi El Kafri and Dr. Hasan Yousef, for their 
valuable comments on my thesis.   
I am grateful to my parents and my wife for their patience and love.  I would 
like to thank my colleagues who also gave me valuable comments on my research.  
 
 VI
CONTENTS 
 
Abstract II 
Acknowledgments III 
List of Algorithms VII 
List of Figures VIII 
List of Tables IX 
List of Abbreviations X 
List of Symbols XI 
 
1 Introduction                                       1 
2 Elliptic Curves                                     10 
2.1 Weierstrass Equations.............................................................................10 
2.2 The Group Law.......................................................................................17 
2.3 Addition Formulas ..................................................................................20 
2.4 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields ...........................................................26 
2.5 Counting the number of points ...............................................................30 
2.6 Discrete Logarithm Problem for Elliptic Curves ....................................31 
2.6.1 Known Algorithms ........................................................................32 
2.6.2 Weak Curves…… ........................................................................33 
2.7 Optimizing ECC Implementations..........................................................33 
2.7.1 Domain Parameters........................................................................34 
2.7.2 Coordinate Systems .......................................................................37 
2.7.3 Exponentiation ….. ..................................................................38 
3 Elliptic Curve Exponentiation                                    39 
 VII
3.1 Base-2 Representations of Integers.........................................................39 
3.1.1 Signed Binary Representation .......................................................41 
3.2 Algorithms for Elliptic Curve Exponentiation........................................43 
3.2.1 Binary Methods…. . .......................................................................44 
3.2.2 Sliding Window applied on NAF ..................................................49 
3.2.3 The width-w Non Adjacent Form (wNAF)....................................52 
3.2.4 The width-w Mutual opposite Form (wMOF) ...............................54 
4 Contribution of This Thesis                                    63 
4.1 Direct Computation of 2 1n n2 (2 P +Q) in affine coordinate ...................63 
4.1.1 The Break-Even Point....................................................................71 
4.2 Exponentiation with Direct Computation of  2 1n n2 (2 P +Q) ................73 
4.2.1 Complexity Analysis of the wMOF Method .................................74 
4.3 Implementation and Results....................................................................78 
4.3.1 Elliptic Curves domain parameters and Platforms ........................78 
4.3.2 Timings analysis of wMOF  Exponentiation  Method...................79 
5 Conclusion                                     83 
Appendix A  Mathematical Background                                    85 
A.1 Basic Algebra............................................................................................85 
A.2 Projective Space........................................................................................87 
Appendix B                                      89 
B.1  Recommended NIST Elliptic Curves over Prime Fields .........................89 
B.2  Complete Java code..................................................................................90 
Bibliography                                    100 
 VIII 
LIST OF ALGORITHMS 
  
 3.1     Generation of NAF ....................................................................................43 
 3.2     Right-To-Left Binary Method  ..................................................................44 
 3.3     General Right-To-left Binary Method  ......................................................45 
 3.4     Left-To-Right Binary Method ...................................................................46 
 3.5     General Left-To-Right Binary Method  .....................................................47 
 3.6     Sliding Window applied on NAF ..............................................................51 
 3.7     Generation of wNAF ..................................................................................52 
 3.8     Exponentiation with wNAF  ......................................................................53 
 3.9     Generation  MOF from Binary ..................................................................56 
 3.10   Generation  wMOF from MOF ..................................................................57 
 3.11   Table Computation with Width w  .............................................................60 
 3.12   Exponentiation  with wMOF ......................................................................61 
 4.1     Direct Computation of 2 1n n2 (2 P +Q) in affine coordinate, where  n1 ≥ 1,    
 and P, Q ∈ E(Fp) . ........................................................................................68 
 4.2   Exponentiation with wMOF Using Direct Computation of 2 1n n2 (2 P +Q) 73 
 
 
 
 
 
 IX
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 1.1 Secret-key schemes...........................................................................................2 
1.2  Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol ..........................................................3 
 1.3  Asymmetric schemes .......................................................................................4 
 2.3  Doubling point P on E ...................................................................................28 
 4.1  Pre-compute and evaluation with 160-bits input ...........................................80 
 4.2    Pre-compute and evaluation with 192-bits input .........................................80 
4.3    Pre-compute and evaluation with 224-bits input .........................................81 
4.4    Pre-compute and evaluation with 256-bits input .........................................81 
 
 X
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 2.1 Points of E over field F23 ................................................................................28 
2.2  The computational complexity of affine and projective coordinate systems.38 
 3.1   The values of X, Q during the iterations of right-to-left binary method ......45 
 3.2  The value of Q during the iterations of left-right binary method ..................47 
3.3 General comparison of table size and non-zero density .................................59 
 4.1  Complexity comparison: Individual doublings and one addition vs. direct 
computation of several doublings with one addition. ...................................72 
 4.2  The ratio of speed between a multiplication and inversion in prime filed Fp79 
 4.3  Comparison of add-double method vs. wMOF method to perform an 
exponentiation...............................................................................................82 
 4.4  Average time comparison required to perform an exponentiation without pre-
computations stage of a random point in mesc (Pentium IV   2.0 GHz). .....82 
  
 XI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AHd       Average Hamming density. 
DLP                   Discrete Logarithm Problem. 
DECDBL (w)    Direct computing of point addition adjoint with w doublings  
ECC                   Elliptic Curve cryptosystem 
ECADD             Elliptic Curve Point Addition. 
ECDBL              Elliptic Curve Point Doubling. 
ECDH                The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
ECDLP              Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. 
ECDSA              The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm  
Hd                      Hamming density. 
Hw                     Hamming weight. 
MOF                 Mutual opposite Form. 
PCK                   Public key cryptosystem  
SW                     Sliding window 
wNAF                Width-w Non Adjacent Form. 
wMOF               Width-w Mutual Opposite Form. 
 XII
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
 
 
A   Affine coordinates. 
t  Bit length of an exponent. 
k  Exponent, i.e. a positive integer. 
ki   The i-th bit of the exponent k, i = 1, . . . , n. 
x     -x, where x is an integer. 
D   Digit set. 
D*   Digit set without zero. 
|D|   The order of the digit set. 
χ   Class of D-representations. 
M   Field multiplication. 
S   Field squaring. 
I   Field inversion. 
F                      Field    
Fq   The field with q elements  
Fp   Prime finite field 
F2m   Binary finite field 
E(Fq)  Additive group of points on an elliptic curve over finite field Fq  
P                     Projective coordinates 
#E(Fq)             The number of points on E over finite field Fq 
 
 XIII 
 1
CHAPTER 1 
 
1 Introduction  
 
Cryptography is the science of securely transmitting messages from a sender to a 
receiver. So the need of cryptography is on the increase, it enable people to 
communicate securely.  People interact electronically, through e-mail, e-
commerce, ATM machines, or mobile.  A cryptosystem is a system of algorithms 
for encrypting and decrypting messages for this purpose.  Many of modern 
cryptosystems have been proposed to achieve aspects of information security as 
confidently, data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation.  
1. Data integrity: service guarantees that the content of the message, that was 
sent, has not been tampered with. 
2. Confidentiality: service protects against unauthorized disclosure of the 
information. 
3. Authentication: service related to identification, and consists of two 
components data origin and entity authentication. 
4. Non-repudiation: service protects against denial by one of the entities 
involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the 
communication.  
In order to obtain these aspects of information security, cryptographers have 
developed a toolbox of cryptographic primitives such as encryption schemes and 
digital signature. These primitive called cryptographic schemes and are also so-
called cryptosystems [32]. 
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The purpose of encryption schemes is to cover confidentiality of encrypting 
the message.  This is done by an encryption function E.  The reverse process, the 
decryption, is done by a decryption function D. Besides the message m, the 
encryption function requires the input of an encryption key e. It returns the 
encrypted message, the ciphertext c.  The ciphertext and a decryption key d are 
the input for the decryption function which returns the original message, the 
plaintext. The respective formulas are given as 
                                                   Ee(m) = c        ,           Dd(c) = m  
There are two mainly different approaches to encrypt messages: symmetric 
schemes, and symmetric schemes.  
In symmetric schemes encryption and decryption are performed using the 
same secret key.  This method is known as secret key or symmetric cryptography. 
Suppose Alice wishes to securely communicate some plaintext to Bob. She 
generally accomplishes this by applying an encryption function E to the plaintext, 
obtaining ciphertext.  Bob must have the inverse function D, and it should not be 
easy for an eavesdropper to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext.  
 
Figure 1.1 Secret-key schemes 
 
While the encryption and decryption with symmetric schemes is very fast, it 
has drawback, namely the key-exchange between communicating parties. When 
                  Alice                                                          Bob 
                  key  k                                                     key   k     
         
 Plaintext                                Ciphertext c                                              
                                                                                          Plaintext  
  m                                                                                           m 
                                                                                                     
E D 
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the sender and the receiver are physically apart, they want to agree on the secret 
key without anyone else finding out.  Then they must share a secret key through 
secure channel. Consequently, in a large system many secret keys must typically 
be generated, stored, managed, and destroyed in a highly secure way.  If, for 
example, n entities want to securely communicate with each other, then there are 
n(n-1)/2 secret keys that must be generated, stored, managed, and destroyed. 
Another approach to agree on secret key between two parties is using a trusted 
third party to prevent the disclosure of the secret key.  Unfortunately, this method 
has many disadvantages.  The most important disadvantage is that each entity 
must unconditionally trust the of third party and share a secret key with it.  There 
are situations in which this level of trust is neither justified nor can be accepted by 
the communicating entities.  
In 1976 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [8] published their paper “New 
Directions in Cryptography” and proposed the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key 
Exchange protocol [8] which allows users to exchange secret keys over an 
insecure channel without any prior shared secret.  This paper resolves the key-
exchange problem and becomes the theoretical concept of asymmetric schemes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2  Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol 
1. Alice and Bob agree on some finite group G and an element g ∈ G. 
2. Alice privately chooses an integer a ∈ {1,…|g|}, and computes  
                                   α = ga. She sends α to Bob 
3. Bob privately chooses an integer b ∈{1,…|g|}, and computes  
                                  β = gb. He sends β to Alice. 
4. Alice and Bob can both compute  
k = gab = (ga)b = (gb)a as common secret key. 
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In a asymmetric schemes, each user gets a pair of keys: private key for 
decryption which is kept secret, and public key for encryption which can be made 
public for that reason asymmetric schemes are also referred to as public-key 
schemes.  It is computationally infeasible to deduce the private key from the 
public key.  Anyone who has a public key can encrypt information but cannot 
decrypt it.  Only the person who has the corresponding private key can decrypt the 
information.  
 
Figure 1.3  Asymmetric schemes 
 
Digital signature schemes work similar to asymmetric schemes, namely they 
are based on a complex mathematical problem.  They are designed to provide the 
digital counterpart to handwritten signatures to provide data integrity, data origin 
authentication, and non-repudiation.  A digital signature is generated based on the 
content of the message being signed and some secrets known only to the signer 
including the private key and the signing key.  It must be verifiable by any user in 
the system without accessing the signer's secret information.  
There are only three classes of public key cryptosystems that are considered to 
be both secure and efficient. They are classified below according to the 
mathematical problem on which they are based [1]. 
                  Alice                                                          Bob 
       Bob’s Public key                                             Bob’s private key    
                
                                                                                                  
 Plaintext                         Ciphertext c                            Plaintext  
  m                                                                                           m 
                                                                                                     
E D 
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1. Integer factorization systems: security is based on the intractability of the 
integer factorization problem (IFP). Examples include RSA and Rabin 
signature schemes. 
2. Discrete logarithm systems: security is based on the intractability of the discrete 
logarithm problem (DLP) in a finite field. Examples include ElGamal, and 
DSA. 
3. Elliptic curve discrete logarithm systems: security is based on the intractability 
of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).  Examples include 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). 
 
Elliptic curve cryptosystem ECC is new generation of public key 
cryptosystem that is based on the difficulty of ECDLP.   ECC has advantage over 
the systems which are based on the multiplicative group of a finite field (Fq). As a 
result, the fastest algorithm known for solving the discrete logarithm systems DLP 
in the multiplicative group (Fq) is index-calculus method which solves the DLP in 
sub-exponential time [18], and the best known algorithm for solving the ECDLP 
in this group is Pollard-rho algorithm, it takes about 
2
n π  steps, where a step 
here is an elliptic curve addition, n is the number of elliptic curve points, these 
steps takes full exponential time [2][18][19].  Consequently, one can use an 
elliptic curve group that is smaller in size with the same level of security 
maintained.  The outcomes are smaller key sizes, bandwidth savings and faster 
 6
implementations.  Such characteristics are particularly attractive for security 
applications where computational power and integrated circuit space are limited.  
The elliptic curve cryptographic operations like encryption/decryption, 
schemes generation/verification signature require computing of exponentiation on 
elliptic curve.  The computational performance of elliptic curve cryptographic 
protocol such as Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol strongly depends on the 
efficiency of exponentiation, because it is the costliest operation.  Thus it is very 
attractive to speed up of exponentiation, which allow for efficient 
implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems. 
Three are three ways to speed up of exponentiation: choosing optimal 
underlying field, on which modular reduction is efficient or on which inversion is 
efficient, reducing the number of additions, and reducing the number of 
multiplications and squirings of underlying field by using efficient point 
coordinate system or mixed coordinate systems [7].   
There are two mainly types of elliptic curve exponentiation algorithms of the 
second way: algorithms for a fixed point, and algorithms for a random point.  
These algorithms can compute elliptic curve exponentiation by repeating 
additions and doublings, where the repeated number of additions can be reduced 
by a suitable algorithm, but that of doublings can not be reduced.  
1.  Exponentiation algorithms for a fixed point: compute an elliptic curve 
exponentiation by repeating only additions and no doubling.  In this case, the 
precomputation table method [10] is useful.  
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2. Exponentiation algorithms for a random point: compute an elliptic curve 
exponentiation by repeating additions and doubling.  In this case, the addition-
subtraction method is usually mixed with the window method [10][20][18][26].  
The binary method is the standard algorithm for computing exponentiation in 
the case of a random point.  It based on the binary representation of the exponent, 
the elliptic addition point is performed if scanned bit of exponent is one and 
doubling of elliptic point is performed regardless of scanned bits, so this method 
also so-called add-double.  It can scan the bits of exponent from left to right or 
from right to left, and can be generalized to use base-2 representation.  So the 
average number of addition of elliptic points operations required by the binary 
method or the general binary method depends on the minimal hamming weight of 
the exponent.  Here, the fact that points on an elliptic curve can be inverted at 
negligible costs proved very useful, namely the effort for precomputing the 
required points can be reduced by more than 50%, if the exponent is represented 
in a signed representation.  
There are several base-2 representations which have minimal hamming weight, 
namely the Width-w Non Adjacent Form (wNAF) and siding window on some 
signed binary representations. While those representations speed up the 
exponentiation in the best possible way.  The generation of the wNAF and the 
recoding of signed binary digits for sliding window are only possible starting at 
the least significant bit, i.e. right-to-left. Therefore, the recoding of the n-bit 
exponent must be performed in a separate stage and the whole recoded exponents 
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must be stored, which requires memory of the order of magnitude of n bits for 
both base-2 representations.  
 This problem is solved by using base-2 representation Width-w Mutual 
Opposite Form (wMOF) which provides the same minimal hamming weight of 
exponent as the wNAF.  Their great advantage is, that they can be generated from 
left-to-right which means, that the recoding doesn’t have to be done in a separate 
stage, but can be performed on-the-fly during the evaluation. As a result, it is no 
longer necessary to store the whole recoded exponent, but only small parts at once. 
In detail, the wMOF requires only memory of the order of magnitude of w bits, 
which is very small compared to n-bits. 
Another approach to speed up exponentiation is by increasing the speed of 
doublings.  One method to speed the doublings is direct computation of several 
doubling, which computes 2nP directly from P ∈ E(Fq), without computing 
intermediate points 2P,22P,…,2n-1.  Sakai and Sakurai [28] proposed formulae for 
computing 2nP directly (∀n ≥1) on E(Fp) in terms of affine coordinates.  Since 
modular inversion is more expensive than multiplication, this formula requires 
only one inversion for computing 2nP instead of d inversions in regular add-
double method.  
In this thesis, first we derive formula to compute ( )2 1n n2 2 P+Q  directly from 
P, Q ∈ E(Fp), without computing intermediate points 1
n22P,2 P, ,2 PL , 
1 2 1n n 1 n2(2 P+Q), ,2 (2 P+Q)L − , where n1≥1.  Secondly, we use this formula to 
improve evaluation stage for computing exponentiation with wMOF method.  
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Furthermore, we show in what way this new derived formula can improve the 
speed of the exponentiation with wMOF.  A comparison was made based on 
notation of a "break even point" which is the cost factor of one inversion 
relatively to the cost of one multiplication.  
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives background on elliptic 
curve and discuses their various properties. Chapter 3 presents base-2 
representation of integer and introduces algorithms for the efficient computation 
of elliptic curve exponentiation.  Those were the binary and the general binary 
methods which use minimal hamming weight signed representations of the 
exponent, namely the wNAF, siding window on some applied on NAF and 
wMOF which left to right minimal hamming weight representation. Finally 
derived formula for direct computation of several doubling of elliptic points in 
affine coordinates is presented. Chapter 4 presents new formula for computing 
( )2 1n n2 2 P+Q  directly from P, Q ∈ E(Fp), without computing intermediate 
points 1n22P,2 P, ,2 PL .  Chapter 4 also shows in what way this formula can 
improve the speed of the exponentiation with wMOF.  Finally Chapter 5 provides 
concluding remarks and discussion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 Elliptic Curves  
Elliptic curves were found as a result of studying the problem of the arc length of 
an ellipse. To compute the arc length one integrates a function 
involving y = f(x) , and the answer is given in terms of certain functions on 
“elliptic” curve  2y = .f(x)   
More recently, elliptic curves have been used in devising efficient algorithm 
for factoring integers and for primality proving.  In mid 1980’s, Koblitz and 
Miller independently proposed the use of a group of points of elliptic curves, 
defined over a finite field, to be used for cryptographic purpose [2].  
First we must to discuss elliptic curves and their various properties. 
2.1 Weierstrass Equations  
Let F be a field.  Consider the following homogeneous cubic equation, called the 
Weierstrass equation: 
 2 3 3 2 2 31 3 2 4 6Y Z + a XYZ + a Y Z  = X  + a X Z + a XZ  + a Z ,     1 6a , ,a K.∈K  (2.1) 
Now consider the polynomial K(X, Y, Z) defined to be the left hand side of 
(2.1) minus its right hand side. Let F  be the algebraic closure of F, and let 
{ }2E = [X, Y, Z] (F)  K(X, Y, Z) = 0 .∈P                       (2.2) 
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E is called the projective curve defined by Weierstrass equation, and the number 
of points on E (the cardinality) is denoted #E(F ). 
Definition  2.1  Let a plane projective curve E, an element [X, Y, Z] ∈ E for 
which 
K K K
(X,Y,Z), (X,Y,Z), (X,Y,Z) (0,0,0)
X Y Z
∂ ∂ ∂ 
= ∂ ∂ ∂ 
               (2.3) 
is called a singular point, and E is said to be smooth, or non-singular curve if 
there are no singular points in E. 
Definition 2.2 An elliptic curve over the field F, is a smooth curve E defined by 
an Weierstrass equation in the form of (2.1).  
Definition 2.3 Let E be an elliptic curve over the field F defined by an 
Weierstrass equation in the form of (2.1).  Let F  be the algebraic closure of F, we 
define the set E(F ) of F -rational points as follows: 
 
{ }2E(F) = [X, Y, Z] ( )  K(X, Y, Z) = 0 .∈P F                        (2.4) 
When we just write E we mean the set of F -rational points, i.e. E =E( ) F  (all 
the points on the curve)  
Recall from Appendix A.2 that 2 ( )P F  is a disjoint union of 2 ( )A F  and the 
line at infinity; let's study the intersection of E with each such piece. First we to 
study the intersection of E with line at infinity i.e. when the condition Z = 0 holds 
in addition to the equation which defines E.  
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If K(X, Y, Z) = 0 is an equation defining an elliptic curve over F, then we see 
from (2.1) that  
K(X, Y, Z) = 0 ⇔ X3 = 0 ⇔ X= 0,  
 and Y is allowed to be anything. Thus, E intersects the line at infinity in the 
points [0, Y, 0], however, since Y ≠ 0, these are all (by the equivalence relation) 
the same point [0, 1, 0].  So, E intersects the line at infinity in the single point Ο  = 
[0, 1, 0].  
Now, to study the intersection of E with 2 ( )A F , we need to see what happens 
when Z ≠ 0. Every element [X, Y, Z] ∈ 2 ( )P F for which Z ≠ 0 has a unique 
representative [x, y, 1], where x = X
Z
 and y = Y
Z
.  
Dividing the original equation for E by Z3, we get 
 64
2
2
3
31
2 a  xa  xa x y a xy a  y +++=++       1 6a , ,a F.K ∈                   (2.5) 
which is an equation in only two variables.  This is Weierstrass non-homogeneous 
equation, and leads to the affine representation of E. 
Now consider the polynomial f(x, y) defined to be the left hand side of (2.5) 
minus its right hand side.  We define the set of F -rational points    
{ }2E(F) = (x,y) ( )  f(x, y) = 0 U∈A F {Ο }                      (2.6) 
Definition 2.4 Let E be a curve given by a non-homogeneous Weierstrass equation 
(2.6). Define the quantities 
2
2 1 2d  = a + 4a  
4 4 1 3d  = 2a  + a a  
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2
6 3 6d  = a 4a+  
2 2 2
8 1 6 2 6 1 3 4 2 3 4d  = a  a  + 4a a  - a a a  + a a  - a  
2 3 2
2 8 4 6 2 4 6= -d  d  - 8d - 27d  + 9d d d∆  
2
4 2 4c  = d  - 24d   
3
4 = c /j(E) ∆  
The quantity ∆  is called the discriminant of the Weierstrass equation, while j(E) 
is called the j-invariant of E if ∆≠ 0. 
Theorem 2.5 The curve E is nonsingular (that is, it’s an elliptic curve) if and only 
if ∆≠ 0  
For a proof of the above theorem, see [9]. 
For fields F with various characteristics, we can transform the Weierstrass 
equation (2.5) into different forms of equations of an elliptic curve E by using 
linear change of variables. We split it into 3 cases: char(F) ≠ 2,3, char(F) = 3 and 
char(F) = 2. The corresponding admissible change of variables will be given in 
each case. 
1. char(F) ≠ 2,3: 
If char(F) ≠ 2, and the change of variables                                                    
1 3a x a
2
+
→ −y y
 
is performed, then the left side of (2.5) after the substitution for y becomes: 
1 3a x a 2
2
(  -  )
+
y + a1x(y - 1 3
a x a
2
+
) + a3(y - 1 3
a x a
2
+
) = . . . 
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                                                        · · · = y 2 - 
2 2
1a
4
x
- 1 3
a a
2
x
-
2
3a
4
 
Both, xy and y have vanished, so their coefficients a1 and a3 must equal zero.  
That reduces the left side to a single y2, and (2.5) becomes: 
y2 = x
3
 + a2x
2 + a4x + a6                                             (2.7) 
Further, if char(F) ≠ 3, and the change of variables 
2a
3
−x x→  
is performed, then the right side of (2.5) after the substitution becomes: 
 ( 2
a
3
−x )3 + a2( 2
a
3
−x )2 + a4( 2
a
3
−x ) + a6 = . . . 
                                                             . . . = x3 + 2 4
a
( + a )  
9
x  + 2
27
3
2a  - 
1
3
a2a4a6 
Setting ( 1
9
a2 + a4) = a, and 227
3
2a  - 
1
3
a2a4a6 = b, we have shorter form of 
Weierstrass non-homogeneous equation:  
y2 = x
3
 + ax + b                                              (2.8)                                   
Recall from theorem 2.5, the curve E is nonsingular or smooth if and only if 
∆≠ 0.  For Weierstrass equation of the form (2.8), we have d2 = 0, d4 = 2a, d6 = 4b, 
d8 = -a
2, c4 = -48a, c6 = -864b, and ∆  = -16(4a
3 + 27b2).  Therefore E is smooth if 
and only if  (4a3 + 27b2) ≠ 0 . 
2. char(F) =3: 
If a2 ≠ 0, and the change of variables   
 4
2
a
a
+→x x  
is performed, then the right side of (2.7) after the substitution becomes: 
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( 4
2
a
a
+x )3 + a2( 4
2
a
a
+x )2 + a4( 4
2
a
a
+x ) + a6 = . . .  
                                                  . . . = x3 + a2 
2x  + 
2 2 3 3
2 4 2 4
3
2
a a a a
a
+ +
 
Setting a2 = a, and 
2 2 3 3
2 4 2 4
3
2
a a a a
a
+ +
 = b, we have Weierstrass non-homogeneous 
equation of the form:  
y2 = x
3
 + ax
2 + b                                                   (2.9)  
If a2 = 0, then by setting a4 = a, and a6= b from (2.7), we immediately have the 
same form (2.8)  
3. char(F) =2: 
Case 1. The supersingular case,  j(E)  = 0, i.e. a1 = 0:  
When the change of variables 
 2a+→x x  
is performed, then left side of (2.5) becomes: 
  y2 + a3y  
and the right side of (2.5) after the substitution becomes: 
( 2a+x )
3 + 2a ( 2a+x )
2 + 4a ( 2a+x ) + 6a  = . . .  
                                                        . . . = x3 + 24 2(a a )+ x  +
2 3
2 2 4 2a a a a+ +     
Setting a3 = a, 
2
4 2(a a )+  = b, and 
2 3
2 2 4 2a a a a+ +  = c, we have Weierstrass non-
homogeneous equation of the form:  
  y2 + ay = x3 + bx + c                                       (2.10) 
Case 2. The nun-supersingular case,  j(E)  ≠ 0, i.e. a1 ≠ 0:  
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When the change of variables 
3
1
a2
1 a
a +→x x  
is performed, then (2.5) after the substitution for x becomes: 
  y2 + a1( 3
1
a3
1 a
a +x )y + a3y = 3
1
a3 3
1 a
(a )+x + a2 3
1
a3 2
1 a
(a )+x  + a4 3
1
a3
1 a
(a )+x  + a6  (2.11) 
 
After the simplification, (2.11) becomes: 
y2 + 31a xy=
6
1a
3
x + 3 41 3 2 1(a a a a )
2
+ x + 2 23 4 1(a a a )+ x +
3 2 2 3
3 3 2 1 4 3 1 1 6
3
1
a a a a a a a a a
a
( )
+ + +
(2.12) 
Now if the change of variables 
2 2
3 1 4 3
1 3
1
a a a
a
a
+
→ +y y  
is performed, then the left side of (2.12) after the substitution for y becomes: 
2 2
1 4 3
3
1
a a a3 2
1 a
(a )
+
+y +
2 2
1 4 3
3
1
a a a3 3
1 1 a
a (a )
+
+x y y =. . .  
                                                   . . .= 61a
2y
 + 6
2 2 2
1 4 3
1
)(a a a
a
+
 + 61a xy +
2 2
3 4 1(a a a )+ x   
Finally (2.12) after the divide by 61a  becomes:  
y2 + xy= 3x + 3 2 1
3
1
(a a a )
a
2+ x +
3 3 2 4 5 6 2 2 2( )
1 3 3 2 1 4 3 1 1 6 1 4 3
12
1
( )
a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a
+ + + − +
   (2.13) 
Setting 3 2 1
3
1
(a a a )
a
+
 = a, and 
3 3 2 4 5 6 2 2 2( )
1 3 3 2 1 4 3 1 1 6 1 4 3
12
1
( )
a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a
+ + + − +
 = b, we 
have Weierstrass non-homogeneous equation of the form:  
  y2 + xy = x3 + ax
2 + b                                      (2.14) 
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2.2 The Group Law 
In what follows, we shall define the operation of addition in the group of points on an 
elliptic curve E over a field F.   
Let E be an elliptic curve given by the Weierstrass equation (2.5) to add two 
points on the curve P and Q together, pass a straight line through them and look 
for the third point of intersection with the curve, R.  Then reflect the point R over 
the x-axis to get –R, the sum of P and Q.  Thus, P + Q = –R.  The idea behind this 
group operation is that the three points P, Q, and R lie on a common straight line, 
and the points that form the intersection of a function with the curve are 
considered to add up to be zero as in Figure 2.1.  If P = Q then the line to be 
constructed is the tangent of E at P, and P + Q =2P as in Figure 2.2. 
. 
Figure 2.1 Elliptic curve point addition 
P 
 
Q 
R 
-R= P+Q 
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Now we want to define the identity element of E, Therefore, we find an extra 
point of intersection where E meets the line connecting P,Q and the point at 
infinity Ο, and call this point P + Q.  By joining Ο  to a point R on E, we mean 
that a vertical line is drawn through P, Q.  Hence, the point at infinity Ο is the 
additive identity element and P + Q + R = Ο  or P + Q = -R, (the inverse of R). 
Now we want to define the inverse of a point P= (x1, y1) ∈ E.  Let P= (x1, y1), 
Q=(x2,y2) ∈ E.  Notice, that if x1 = x2 then  
2 2
1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 2 3 2y + a x y  + a y  = y  + a x y  + a y  ,  
and hence either 
y1 = y2        i.e.  P = Q 
or 
y2 = -y1 - a1x1 - a3 
Figure 2.2 Elliptic curve point doubling 
R 
-R =2P 
P 
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Now define the inverse -P of the point P thus: 
-P = (x1, -y1 - a1x1 - a3). 
From the previous definitions it follows that: 
For all P, Q ∈ E, 
1. Ο + P = P and P + Ο  = P.  That is, Ο is the identity element. 
2. -Ο = Ο 
3. If P = (x1, x2) ∈ Ο, then -P = (x1 , -y1 - a1x1 - a3). 
4. Q = -P, then P + Q = Ο. 
5. If P ≠ Ο; Q ≠ Ο , Q ≠ -P, then let R be the third point of intersection 
(counting multiplicities) of either the line which intersects P and Q if P ≠ 
Q, or the tangent line to the curve at P if P = Q, with the curve.  Then P + 
Q = -R. 
6. P + Q = Q + P. 
Now we can prove that the above rules make the points on an elliptic curve 
into an (abelian) group.  The only group law that is not an immediate consequence 
of the geometrical rules is the associative law.  It can be proved with following 
proposition   
Proposition  2.6  Let L1, L2, L3 be three lines that intersect a cubic curve in nine 
points P1, . . . , P9 (counting multiplicity) and let 1L′ , 2L′ , 3L′  be three lines that 
intersect the cubic curve in nine points Q1, . . . ,Q9. If Pi = Qi for i = 1, . . . , 8, then 
also P9 = Q9. 
The six lines are set as follows 
L1 : the line through P,Q and -(P +Q) 
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L2 : the line through R,-R and Ο 
L3 : the line through -P,-(Q+R) and S = P +(Q+R) 
1L′  : the line through Q, R and -(Q+R) 
2L′ : the line through P,-P and Ο 
3L′ : the line through -(P +Q),-R and  S′ = (P + Q) +R 
Now the lines L1, L2, L3 and 1L′ , 2L′ , 3L′  have eight points of intersection in 
common, namely P,-P,Q,R,-R,-(P + Q),-(Q + R) and Ο.  One can therefore 
conclude that S = S′  which proves the associativity.  
2.3 Addition Formulas  
Let P and Q be two distinct rational points on elliptic curve E.  The straight line 
joining P and Q must intersect the curve at one further point, R, since we are 
intersecting a line with a cubic curve.  The point R will also be rational since the 
line, the curve and the points P and Q are themselves all defined over F.  If we then 
reflect R in the x-axis, we obtain another rational point which we shall call P + Q as in 
Figure 2.1.  
There are different addition formulas for fields of char(F) ≠ 2,3, char(F) = 3 
and char(F) = 2.  This section explains how to derive explicit formulas for point 
additions and point doublings where the char(F) ≠ 2,3 in affine and projective 
coordinate systems.  For simplicity, we look at elliptic curves defined over the real 
number field R. 
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2.3.1 Addition Formulas in Affine Coordinates 
Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) ∈ E defined by an Weierstrass non-homogeneous 
equation (2.8) with P ≠ -Q.  The equation of the line L which intersects P and Q is 
given as 
                                            L : y = λx + β,                                                       (2.15) 
Then P + Q = (x3, y3) can be computed as follows: 
Case1  P≠ Q   
In this case λ  is slope of intersected L  
 
2 1
2 1
(y  - y )
 = 
(x  - x )
λ ,    β = y1-λx1 
The third point where L intersects the curve is R = (xR, yR).  Since P + Q = (x3, y3) 
= (xR, -yR) = -R (the inverse of R, where a1, a3 = 0), holds and inserting this into 
(2.15) yields a formula for the y-coordinate of P + Q. 
yR =  λxR + β 
 y3 = - λx3 + β 
= -λx3 - y1 + λx1 
= λ(x1 - x3) - y1 
The x-coordinate of P + Q is obtained by inserting (2.15) into the equation of the 
ellptic curve defined by an Weierstrass equation in the form of (2.8).  This yields  
(λx + β)2 = x3 + ax + b 
  0 = x3 - λ2x2 + (a - 2λβ)x - λ2 + b 
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This equation can be solved by using the fact that the sum of the roots of a monic 
polynomial is equal to minus the coefficient of the variable of the second highest 
power.  The three roots are x1, x2, x3 and the coefficient is -λ
2.  Therefore x1 + x2 
+ x3 = λ
2 holds and since two of those roots are given by the x-coordinates of the 
points P and Q, x3 can be calculated. Hence, the formula for a point addition in 
affine coordinates is:  
x3 = λ
2   - x1 - x2 
                                    y3 =λ (x1 - x3) - y1                                                         (2.16) 
2 1
2 1
(y  - y )
 = 
(x  - x )
λ  
 
Case 2:  P = Q  
In this case λ  is given as the derivative 
2 
1
1
3x ady
 = 
dx 2y
λ
+
=  
in P = (x1, y1), because the line L is now the tangent on the curve in P.  The 
formula for a point doubling in affine coordinate can be derived by using the same 
arguments as above and is given as 
x3 =λ
2  - 2x1 
y3 = λ (x1 - x3) - y1                                                                               (2.17) 
2 
1
1
3x a
2y
λ
+
=                                                                      
Note, that x1 = x2 holds in that case.  
The drawback of affine coordinates is, that the required field inversion is very 
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costly compared to multiplications and squarings.  To avoid inversions, alternative 
coordinate systems such as projective coordinates are used. 
2.3.2 Addition Formulas in Projective Coordinates 
Recall from section 2.1 that every element [X, Y, Z] ∈ P
2
(F) for which Z ≠ 0 has 
a unique representative [x, y, 1], where x = X
Z
 and y = Y
Z
.  The transformation 
between affine and Projective coordinates is: 
 (x, y) ∈ A
2
(F)  [x, y, 1] ∈ P
2
(F) 
[X, Y, Z] ∈ P
2
(F)   (X/Z, Y/Z) ∈ A
2
(F) 
When we apply the transformation (2.18) on Weierstrass non-homogeneous 
equation (2.8) and multiply by a power of Z to clear denominators we get 
homogeneous equation: 
Y2Z = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3                                                                                     (2.19) 
To get the formula for a point addition in projective coordinates we apply 
transformation (2.18) to (2.16) as follows: 
Let P = (X1, Y1, Z1), Q = (X2, Y2, Z2), P≠ ±Q, and P + Q = (X3, Y3, Z3).  Then 
3x  
2
2 1
2 1 1 2
2
1 22 1
2 1
Y Y
 
Z Z X X
=  -  - 
Z ZX X
Z Z
æ öç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷è ø
æ öç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷è ø
 
       
2
2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
2 1 1 2 1 2
Y Z -Y Z X Z - X Z -2X Z
= - 
X Z -X Z Z Z
æ ö æ öç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷è ø è ø
 
Let u = 2 1 1 2Y Z -Y Z ,  v = 2 1 1 2X Z -X Z ; this yields 
(2.18) 
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 3x =
2
1 2
1 2
-2X Z
- 
Z Z
u v
v
æ öæ ö ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷è ø è ø
 
Let A= u2 1 2Z Z
 - v3 -2v2 1 2X Z ; this yields 
3x =
1 2
A
Z Z2v
= 3
3
X
Z
 
3y  
2 1
2 1 31 1
1 3 12 1
2 1
Y Y
 
Z Z XX Y
=  - 
Z Z ZX X
Z Z
æ öç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷ æ öè ø ç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷æ öçè øç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷è ø
 
3y
2 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 1 2 1 11 2
Y Z -Y Z X A Y
=  - 
X Z -X Z Z ZZ Z2v
æ öæ öç ÷ç ÷ç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øè ø
 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
X Z -A Y Z
= -
Z Z Z Z
2 3
2 3
u v v
v v v
æ öæ öç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øç ÷è ø
 
1 2 1 2
1 2
X Z -A)- Y Z
= 
Z Z
2 3
3
u(v v
v
= 3
3
Y
Z
 
In total, this yields  
3X  = Av                                                                 (2.20) 
3Y  = 1 2 1 2( X Z -A)- Y Z
2 3u v v                                  (2.21) 
3Z = 1 2Z Z
3v                                                           (2.22) 
Now to obtain the formula for a point doubling in projective coordinates we apply 
transformation (2.18) to (2.17) as follows: 
Let P = (X1, Y1, Z1) and 2P = (X3, Y3, Z3).  Then  
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3x  
22
1
1 1
11
1
X
3 a
Z X
=  - 2  
ZY
2
Z
æ öæ öç ÷ç ÷ç ÷+ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øç ÷ç ÷ç ÷æ öç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øç ÷è ø
 
( )
22 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1
3X aZ 8Y Z
=   
4Y Z
+ -
    
Let w = 2 21 13X aZ+ , s = 1 1Y Z , B = 1 1X Z s  , h = w
2 – 8B; this yields 
 3x 2 2
1 1
h
= 
4Y Z
 = 3
3
X
Z
 
3y  
2
1
1 31 1
1 3 11
1
X
3 a
Z XX Y
= -  
Z Z ZY
2
Z
æ öæ öç ÷ç ÷ç ÷+ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷æ öè øç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ -ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷æ ö çç ÷è øç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øç ÷è ø
 
 
2
1
1 31 1
1 3 11
1
X
3 a
Z XX Y
= -  
Z Z ZY
2
Z
æ öæ öç ÷ç ÷ç ÷+ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷æ öè øç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ -ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷æ ö çç ÷è øç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øç ÷è ø
 
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 11 1
3X aZ X h Y
= -  
2YZ Z Z4Y Z
æ öæ ö+ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷-ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øè ø
 
2 3
1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 11 1
4X Y Z h 4Y Z
= -  
2YZ Z4Y Z
w æ öæ ö -ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øè ø
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( ) 31 1 1 1
3 3
1 1
4X Y s h 4Y Z
= 
8Y Z
w - -
 
( ) 2 21
3
B h 4Y s
= 
8s
w - -
= 3
3
Y
Z
 
In total, this yields  
3X  = 2hs                                                                 (2.23) 
3Y  = ( )
2 2B h 4Y s1w - -                                        (2.24) 
3Z = 
38s                                                                  (2.25) 
2.4 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields 
Calculations over the real numbers are slow and inaccurate due to round-off error. 
Cryptographic applications require fast precise arithmetic.  So we are only 
interested in finite fields Fq.  The formulas stated previously do not change.  But 
instead of using floating-point arithmetic use a large number and do all 
calculations modulo a large prime.  
The key of the implementation of cryptosystem (ECC) is the selection of elliptic 
curve groups over the finite field of Fp and F2m, where p is a prime and m is 
positive integer. By definition, elliptic curve groups are additive groups.  Any 
such field is isomorphic to F[x]/ ( )f x , where f(x) =
m 1
i i p
i 0
, Fm ix a x a
-
=
+ Îå , is a 
manic irreducible polynomial of degree m over Fp.     
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Three kinds of finite fields Fq are especially suitable for elliptic curve 
cryptosystem (ECC), binary fields F2m, prime fields Fp, and optimal extension 
fields (OEF) Fpm [30].  
2.4.1 Prime Finite fields Fp 
For the finite fields Fq of q elements , where q = p
m for some prime p and positive 
integer m =1, there is a finite field Fp, which is called a prime finite field and 
consists of the set of integers modulo p, which are the all possible results of 
reduction modulo p: 
 {0, 1, 2, …., p-1}    
The arithmetic operation on Fp is the usual addition, subtraction and multiplication 
modulo p.  
For elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp, Weierstrass non-homogeneous 
equation (2.8) can be used in which the variable and coefficients all take on values 
in the integers modulo p. For some prime number p ≠ 2,3, Weierstrass non-
homogeneous equation (2.8) can be rewritten as:  
y2 mod p =(x
3
 + ax + b) mod p                              (2.26)               
  where (4a3 + 27b2)mod p ≠ 0 , for a, b ∈ Fp. 
Example 2.8  Let p = 23.  Consider elliptic curve E: y2 = x3 - 7x + 2 defined over 
F23.  Note that 4a
3 + 27b2 = -1264 (mod 23) ≡ 1 ≠ 0, so E is indeed an elliptic 
curve. 
Indeed E has 26 points - all of them are explicitly shown in Table 2.1. The 
distribution of these points is graphically expressed in Figure 2.3.  
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Table 2.1 Points of E over field F23 
                                                                                                  
 
Figure 2.3 : Doubling point P on E 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Doubling point P on E 
We choose P (9, 1) is a point of E, because it satisfies the curve equation: 12 = 93 
+ 7(9) + 3 (mod 23).   Let’s add points P + P.  According to definition P + P = 2P 
= - R = (xR, -yR), where λ = (3*92 –7)/2 = 236/2 = 6*12 ≡ 3 (mod 23), xR = 32 – 
2*9 = -9 ≡ 14 (mod 23) and -yR = -1 + 3(9 – 14) = -16 ≡ 7 (mod 23).   Hence 2P 
=-R= (14, 7).  Let’s count also point -R = P + P + P = 2P + P, it means we add 
points 2P = (14,7) and P = (9,1).  Results are λ = (7 – 1)/(14 – 9) = 6*14 ≡ 15 
(mod 23), xR = 152 - 14 - 9 ≡ 18 (mod 23), -yR = -7 + 15(14 – 18) ≡ 2 (mod 23), 
thus 3P = (18, 2).  Equally we can count 4P, 5P, …, 12P = (9, 22), 13P = Ο.  
(0,5) (15,11) 
(0,18) (15,12) 
(3,10) (17,9) 
(3,13) (17,14) 
(5,0) (18,2) 
(9,1) (18,21) 
(9,22) (19,9) 
(10,9) (19,14) 
(10,14) (21,10) 
(12,6) (21,13) 
(12,17) (22,10) 
(14,7) (22,13) 
(14,16) Ο 
0
5
10
15
20
25
0102030
x
y
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Obviously 14P = 13P + P = Ο + P = P, thus we finish the cycle and reach the 
starting point again. 
2.4.2 Binary Finite Field F2m 
The finite field F2m, called a binary finite field, of  
m2  elements, can be viewed as 
vector space of dimension m over F2.  That is, there exist a set of m elements 
{ }0 1 0 1, , , , m-α α α αK  in F2m such that, each a∈ F2m can be written uniquely in 
the form: 
m 1
i
i 0
ia α
-
=
å   
 where ia  ∈ {0,1}. 
The elements of F2m should be represented by bit strings of length m.  There 
are several ways of performing arithmetic in F2m.  The specific rules depend on 
how the string of bits is represented. There are two common structures for basis 
representation: polynomial basis representation and normal basis representation [2] 
Polynomial base.  A polynomial base is of the form { }2 11, , , , ,m-α α αK where α  
is a root of an irreducible polynomial f(x) of degree m over F2.  The field is then 
realized as F2[x]/ ( )f x , and the arithmetic is that of polynomials of degree at 
most m-1, modulo f(x), ( )f x  is the cyclic group generated by f(x)[2]. 
 Normal base. A normal base of F2m over F2 has the form { }2 12 21, , , , m-α α αK  
for someα∈ F2m.  It is known that such bases exist for all n ≥1.  Normal bases are 
useful mostly in hardware implementations.  First, the field squaring operation is 
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trivial in normal base representations, as it amounts to just cyclic shifting of the 
binary vector representing the input operand.  
2.4.3 Optimal Extension Fields(OEFs) (2 )n mc±F  
Optimal Extension Fields(OEFs) are class of extension fields Fpm, which exploit 
the optimization of integer arithmetic in modern processors to produce the fastest 
multiplication results over binary and prime fields. 
The OEF is defined as Fpm which satisfies the following: 
• p is a prime less than but close to word size of the processor. 
• p is a pseudo-Mersenne  prime given in the form p = 2n c± , where 
 122log c n£   
The elements of Fpm should be represented by a sequence of m words.  All 
arithmetic operations are performed modulo the field polynomial.    
2.5 Counting the number of points  
Elliptic curve cryptosystems generally involve the selection of a suitable elliptic 
curve E and a point P on E called the base point.  To learn more about the 
structure of the group E(F) it is useful to know the exact value of #E(F).  We will 
look at the case when F is Fq, a finite field of q elements.  The following results 
are the best known methods to date for computing #E. 
Theorem 2.9 [Hasse's ] Let N be the number of points on an elliptic curve over 
Fq, a finite field with q elements.  Then  
|N - (q + 1)| ≤ 2 q  
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In another way, Hasse's Theorem gives the estimate #E(Fq) = q+1-t  where |t| ≤ 
2 q [2]. 
Hasse’s theorem enables one to compute #E(Fqk ) from #E(Fq) as follows. 
Let t = q + 1 - #E(Fq). Then 
                                 #E(Fq
k ) = qk + 1 –αk- βk  
where 1 - tT + qT2 = (1 -αT)(1 - βT)[2][16]. 
Schoof 's Algorithm: In 1985, Schoof presented a deterministic algorithm that 
could compute #E(Fq) (its precise value; not a bound or an estimate) in O(log9 q) 
bit operations (where q is some power of p)[2]. This deterministic polynomial 
time algorithm is the fastest to date, and given few alternatives, it is the best 
choice for computing #E.  But in practice, it is awkward and costly to implement, 
particularly when q is large.  
2.6 Discrete Logarithm Problem for Elliptic Curves 
In 1980 Neal Koblitz and Victor Mille independently proposed elliptic curve 
cryptosystems (ECC), based on the difficulty of mathematical problem so-called 
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)[2].  
Indeed the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem ECDLP is the inverse 
operation of exponentiation in elliptic curve, which can be stated as follows.  Fix 
an elliptic curve.  kP represents the point P added to itself k times.  Suppose Q is a 
multiple of P, so that  
Q = kP 
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for some integer k. Then the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is to 
determine k given P and Q. 
 Now we are ready to define the ECDLP as follows:  
Definition 2.7 [Elliptic curve discrete Logarithm Problem-ECDLP] given an 
elliptic curve E defined over finite field Fq , a point P∈ E(Fq)  of order n, and a 
point Q∈ E(Fq), find an integer k, 0≤ k ≤ n-1, for which Q = kP[1] [2]. 
2.6.1 Known Algorithms 
The Phlig–Hellman algorithm reduces the determination of k to the determination 
of k modulo each of the prime factors of n.  Therefore, to achieve the maximum 
possible security level, n should be prime.  To date, the fastest algorithm for 
solving ECDLP is the Pollard ρ−method, as modified by Gallant, Lambert and 
Vanstone, and Wiener and Zuccherato, which takes about πn
2
steps, where each 
step is an elliptic curve addition. In addition, Van Oorschot and Wiener showed 
how the Pollard ρ−method can be parallelized so that if r processors are used, the 
expected number of steps by each processor before a single discrete logarithm is 
obtained is πn
2
[1][2].  For elliptic curves E defined over a subfield F2k of F2m, 
the parallelized Pollard ρ−method for ECDLP in E(F2m ) can be sped up to an 
expected running time of πnk/m
2r
.  Therefore the fastest known algorithm that 
solves ECDLP in general is the Pollard ρ−method which it runs in full exponential 
time.  Since the index calculus methods can compute discrete logarithm problem 
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(DLP) in the multiplicative group of a finite field (Fq) in sub-exponential time, 
they cannot be applied to the case of discrete logarithms over elliptic curves[1][2]. 
2.6.2 Weak Curves 
There are certain types of elliptic curves in which a successful attack could take 
place in sub-exponential time.  These curves can easily be tested for and avoided. 
Such curves are called the supersingular curves and anomalous curves. 
Supersingular curves are a special class of elliptic curves on which the elliptic 
curve logarithm can be reduced to the case of discrete logarithms in a 
multiplicative group (DLP).  When combined with sub-exponential algorithms for 
solving the classical DLP, this yields a probabilistic subexponential running time 
for computing elliptic curve logarithms on supersingular curves.  This was a 
finding due to Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone (MOV) in 1991, in which they 
showed how the ECDLP could be reduced to classical DLP in an extension of a 
multiplicative group Fq[1][2][9]. 
The other class of curves, the anomalous curves, allows an even more efficient 
attack when applicable.  Proposed independently in 1998 by Satoh and Araki, 
Semaev, and the following year by Smart, this type of curves allow the ECDLP to 
be solved in polynomial time by reducing it to the classical DLP in an additive 
group Fq [1][2][9].  
2.7 Optimizing ECC Implementations 
To get efficient elliptic curve cryptosystem, some important issues must be 
addressed before implementing that affect the efficiency of the computations.  
These include selection of elliptic curve domain parameters (underlying finite 
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field, field representation, and elliptic curve), selecting suitable coordinate 
systems, and choosing efficient algorithms for exponentiation which is the most 
elliptic curve operation.   
2.7.1 Domain Parameters 
When setting up an elliptic curve cryptosystem, there are three basic decisions 
that need to be made: 
1. Selection of the underlying finite field Fq. 
2. Selection of the representation for the elements of Fq. 
3. Selection of the elliptic curve E over Fq. 
2.7.1.1   Selection of the Underlying Finite Field Fq 
The field operations of modular addition and subtraction are relatively fast and 
easily implemented.  However, modular multiplication (which requires a modular 
reduction) and modular inversion are much more time consuming.  The following 
remarks discuss how the choices of the underlying field, and its representation. 
1. Three kinds of finite fields Fq are especially suitable for elliptic curve 
cryptosystem (ECC), binary fields F2m, prime fields Fp, and optimal extension 
fields (OEF) Fpm.  
2. The arithmetic operation on Fp is the usual addition, subtraction and 
multiplication modulo p. However using standard modular arithmetic is not very 
efficient since multi-precision remaindering operations are very expensive.  Hence 
when used in elliptic curve systems there are various choices that are often made: 
General Primes For general primes the most efficient implementation technique 
is almost always to use Montgomery Arithmetic.  Montgomery arithmetic uses a 
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special representation to perform efficient arithmetic, the division and 
remaindering essentially being performed by bit shifting.  
Generalized Mersenne Primes Certain primes are highly suited for efficient 
reduction techniques, the most simple form of such primes being the Mersenne 
primes, which are primes of the form p = 2k -1.  However the number of Mersenne 
primes of the correct size for cryptography is limited[30].  
3. Looking at F2m as a vector space of dimension m over F2, the elements of F2m 
can be represented as binary vectors (or strings) of length m, given a suitable basis 
of this vector space.  This makes it easy to store data in hardware (ideally in shift 
registers of length r).  Addition in F2m can be performed in one clock cycle by 
bitwise XOR-ing the operands. 
4. In software environments in which an arithmetic processor is already available 
for modular exponentiation, the performance of Fp can be improved so that in 
some cases it exceeds the performance of F2m.  This holds true for platforms such 
as those using Pentium processors or, in the case of smart cards, those having a 
crypto coprocessor to accelerate modular arithmetic. 
5. If the field F2m is selected as the underlying finite field, then there are many 
ways in which the elements of F2m can be represented. The two most efficient 
ways are an optimal normal basis representation and a polynomial basis 
representation.  
6. When using a normal basis representation for the elements of F2m, squaring a 
field element becomes a simple cyclic shift of the vector representation, and thus 
the multiplication count in adding two points is reduced. 
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2.7.1.2  Selection of an Suitable Elliptic Curve 
To obtain secure ECC, elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fq must satisfy 
the following conditions: 
1. To resist the Pollard ρ-attack mentioned, #E(Fq) should be divisible by a 
sufficiently large prime n (for example, n > 2160). 
2. To resist the Semaev–Smart–Satoh–Araki attack, #E(Fq) should not be equal to 
q. 
3.  To resist the MOV reduction attack, n should not divide qk-1 for all 1 ≤  k≤  C, 
where C is large enough so that it is computationally infeasible to find discrete 
logarithms in F*qc.  
Indeed, there are four techniques for selecting an appropriate elliptic curve[2]. 
1) Using Hasse’s Theorem.  This technique can be used for picking curves over 
F2m where m is divisible by a small integer l ≥  1.  
To select an appropriate curve over F2m, we first pick an elliptic curve over a 
small field F2
l, where l divides m, compute #E(F2
l) exhaustively, and then use 
Hasse’s theorem to determine #E(F2m).  If conditions (1), (2) and (3) above (with 
q = 2m) are not satisfied, then another curve is selected and the process is repeated.  
2) The Global Method.  Another possibility is to choose an elliptic curve defined 
over a number field and then reduce it modulo a prime ideal such that the 
resulting curve over a finite field satisfies conditions (1), (2) and (3).  
3) Multiplication Method.  The method of complex multiplication (CM) allows 
the choice of an elliptic curve order before the curve is explicitly constructed. 
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Thus, orders can be generated and tested to satisfy conditions (1), (2) and (3); a 
curve is constructed only when these conditions are met.  
4) Choosing a Curve at Random.  Another approach to selecting an appropriate 
elliptic curve E over Fq is to select random parameters a, b ∈  Fq such that (4a
3 + 
27b2) ≠ 0.   One then computes u = #E(Fq) and factors u. This process is repeated 
until conditions (1), (2) and (3) are satisfied. 
2.7.2 Coordinate Systems 
One of the crucial decisions when implementing an efficient elliptic curve 
cryptosystem is deciding which point coordinate system to use.  The point 
coordinate system used for addition and doubling of points on the elliptic curve 
determines the efficiency of these routines, and hence the efficiency 
exponentiation.  
Affine coordinates are the simplest to understand and are used for 
communication between two parties because they require the lowest bandwidth.  
The drawback of affine coordinates is, that the required field inversion is very 
costly compared to multiplications and squarings.  So, alternative coordinate 
systems such as Projective coordinates can be used to avoid inversions.  
Table 2.2 shows the computational complexity of point addition and doublings 
in two coordinate systems on the elliptic curve over Fp , where M, S and I denote 
field multiplication, squaring and inversion respectively, and the cost of field 
additions and subtractions are ignored. 
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Addition Doubling Coordinate 
M S I M S I 
Affine 2 1 1 2 2 1 
Projective  12 2 0 7 3 0 
Table 2.2  The computational complexity of affine and projective coordinate systems. 
 
Cohen et al. [7] recommended the idea of mixed coordinates, where the inputs 
and outputs to point additions and doublings may be in different coordinates.  
2.7.3 Exponentiation  
Elliptic curve exponentiation can be computed by repeating additions and 
doublings, where the average number of addition of elliptic points operations 
depends on the minimal hamming weight of the exponent. The minimal hamming 
weight representation of exponent can be obtained by using windowing method,  
and mixed with the addition-subtraction method for reducing the number of 
additions [10][20].  
 39
CHAPTER 3 
3 Elliptic Curve Exponentiation   
Elliptic curve exponentiation is the operation of computing kP for a given point P 
on an elliptic curve and integer k. It is the primary operation in elliptic curve 
cryptosystem such as ECDH, which is denoted by 
 Q = kP
 
where Q, P are points on an elliptic curve and k is an integer; the cost of executing 
such cryptosystems depends mostly on the complexity of exponentiation.  Thus, 
the performance and execution time of such elliptic curve cryptosystems is 
primarily determined by using efficient algorithms for exponentiation.  
One approach to speed up the elliptic curve exponentiation kP, P ∈ E(Fq) is by 
reducing of the number of additions.  It is possible to reduce the number of 
additions by recoding the integer k into a representation having minimal number 
of nonzero digits [10].  
Next section presents how to represent integer k with minimal number of 
nonzero digits. 
3.1 Base-2 Representations of Integers 
The involved exponent of elliptic curve exponentiation operation is positive 
integer.  There are several ways to represent an integer rather than well known 
decimal representation. One of these representations is so-called base-2 
representations where the integer is represented by the sum of multiple powers of 
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two.  In base-2 representations digits other 0 and 1 are permitted.  The set of digits 
is called digit set and denoted by D [12]. 
 Definition 3.1 The sequence t-1 0(k , . . . , k )  is called a D-representation of the 
integer k, if   
 k =
t
i
i
i=0
k .2∑   and  Dik  , i = 0, . . . , t - 1.∈ ∀                            (3.1) 
where D is called the digit set  and the number of elements in the digit set, i.e. its 
order is denoted by |D| [12]. 
If D = {0, 1} holds, then we give the simplest base-2 representation which is 
the uniquely determined binary representation. The length of this representation, 
the so-called bit length t is calculated as t = 2log  k +1    .  The ki are called bits, 
which is short for binary digits.  If D = {0, ±1} holds, the representation is also 
called a signed binary representation.  More general, If D = {0,±1, . . . ,±x} holds, 
the representation is also called a signed representation. For example the sequence 
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) is binary representation of 86 with bit length 6, since 
86 = 1* 26 + 0* 25 + 1* 24 + 0* 23 + 1* 22 + 1* 21 + 0* 20 
In general, D-representations loose the property of uniqueness.  For example 
(1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 )  and (1, 1, 0,1 , 0, 1)  are both signed binary representations of 45 
with bit length 6, where 1  = -1. 
It is necessary to measure the quality of representations.  This can be done by 
using the weight of either one D-representation separately or several D-
representations at once.  
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Definition 3.2 Let k = t-1 0(k , . . . , k ) be a D-representation with bit length t. The 
Hamming weight of k is the number of non-zero digits in k and denoted by Hw(k). 
The Hamming density of k is given as Hd(k) = Hw(k)/n.  The average Hamming 
density of a class of D-representations χ is the expected Hamming density of a 
randomly chosen D-representation in χ with bit length n→∞  and denoted by 
AHd(χ). 
3.1.1 Signed Binary Representation  
Signed binary representation is redundant binary representation.  It does not 
exhibit a unique minimal form.  Algorithms to generate a minimal representation 
are widely reported for exponentiation, and multiplication [12].  
In 1951 Booth presented an algorithm to multiply two numbers by converts a 
2’s complement binary number to a signed binary digit set D = {0, ±1}.  Booth 
algorithm scans the bits from right to left, and replaces a consecutive block of   
several 1's by a block of 0's and 1  according to 
{ {
a a 1
1...1 1,0...0 ,1
−
   
→      
   
[30]. 
Example 3.3 Let k = 221 with binary representation (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1) then 
Booth algorithm convert this binary representation to (1 , 0,  1,  1,  0,  0, 1,  1, 1) . 
However, Booth recoding has a challenging, if two blocks of 1's are separated 
by an isolated 0, the Booth algorithm does not use the fact that ( ) ( )1,1 0,1≡ .  For 
example, { {1...1,0,1...1
a b
 
 
 
 
 is replaced by 
{ {1,0...0 ,1 ,1,0...0 ,1
a 1 b 1
 
 
 
− − 
and not by { {1,0...0 ,1 ,0...0 ,1
a b 1
 
 
 
− 
. 
Therefore Booth recoding output is not sparse, and the Hw of exponent k of large 
t bits, is (t +1)/2 on average which is not minimal [5].  
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Later, in 1960, through his investigations on how to reduce the number of 
additions and subtractions used in binary multiplication and division, Reitwiesner 
presented a method to convert an exponent k from binary to its canonical form of 
signed binary representation so-called NAF[10][13].   
Definition 3.4 A signed binary representation is said to be non-adjacent form 
(NAF), if no two adjacent digits are nonzero. 
Reitwiesner scans the bits from right to left, and replaces a consecutive block of 
several 1's by a block of 0's and 1 according to 
{ {
a a 1
1...1 1,0...0 ,1
−
   
→      
   
, If two 
blocks of 1's are separated by an isolated 0, the Reitwiesner algorithm uses the 
fact that ( ) ( )1,1 0,1≡ .  For example, { {1...1,0,1...1
a b
 
 
 
 
 is replaced by { {1,0...0 ,1 ,0...0 ,1
a b 1
 
 
 
− 
 
and not by 
{ {1,0...0 ,1 ,1,0...0 ,1
a 1 b 1
 
 
 
− − 
.  So Reitwiesner's algorithm is also known as Booth 
canonical recoding algorithm [8].  
Example 3.5 Let k = 221 with binary representation (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1) The 
NAF of k is generated as follows 
   1    1    0   1    1    1    0   1 
                  1    0   1  
        1    1    0  
    1   0  1  
1   0   
_____________________
1   0    0   1   0    0   1   0   1
 
 
Hence, the NAF of 221 is given as (1 , 0 ,  0, 1,  0,  0, 1, 0,  1) . 
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Algorithm 3.1 (Reitwiesner algorithm), shows how to generate non-adjacent 
form (NAF) of exponent k from binary form of k.  
Algorithm 3.1   Generation of NAF     [13] 
    INPUT:  An t-bit exponent k in its binary representation t 1 t 0( k ,k ,...,k )−  
 OUTPUT: The NAF of t 1 t 0( , ,..., ) of  kµ µ µ−  
1. c 0;k 0;k 00 t 1 t← ← ←+  
2. for i from 0 to t do 
    2.1   c ( c k k ) / 2i 1 i i i 1← + + + +             
     2.2  i i i i 1c k 2cµ +← + −  
3. return The NAF t 1 t 0( , ,..., ) of  kµ µ µ−  
 
Reitwiesner's proved the NAF propriety of his output, and this representation 
is unique and has minimal Hw [13]. Morain and Olives [20] showed that on 
average the minimal Hw of exponent t-digits k in binary signed representation is 
equal to 
(t + 1)
3
. 
3.2 Algorithms for Elliptic Curve Exponentiation  
 Since elliptic curve exponentiation kP, where k is a positive integer and P a given 
point on elliptic curve is defined as  
k times
kP = P + . . . + P   1 4 2 4 3   
 For large integer k, computing exponentiation kP for a given point P on an elliptic 
curve is costly endeavor, and it is inefficient to use straightforward summation 
technique that requires (k-1) elliptic additions, so other techniques should be used 
to efficiently compute exponentiation.   
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3.2.1 Binary Methods 
Binary methods are the standard algorithms for the efficient computation of an 
exponentiation.  These algorithms use the binary representation of the exponent. 
There are two different binary methods, one that scans the bits of the exponent 
from right-to-left and other from left-to-right.  A doubling is performed at each 
step, but performing addition depends on the scanned bit value, so it called double 
and add algorithms.  
3.2.1.1 Right-to-Left Binary Method  
Let P a point in elliptic curve, and t-bit exponent k in its binary representation.  It 
possible to compute  
  kP = t -1 t -2t-1 t-2 1 0(k 2  + k 2  + ...+ k 2 + k ) P                      
       = t -1 t -2t-1 t-2 1 0k 2 P + k 2 P + ...+ k 2 P+ k P                                    
Algorithm 3.2 is adapted from [13] to present right-to-left binary method.  
Algorithm 3.2  Right-To-Left Binary Method       [13] 
INPUT : an element P ∈ E(Fq ), t-bit exponent k in its binary representation.  
OUTPUT : kP 
1. X ←Ο  (where Ο  is infinity ) 
2. Q P←  
3. For i  from  0 to t-1  do the following 
      3.1  if ki = 1  then  X← ECADD(X, Q)  
      3.2  Q←ECDBL(Q) 
4.  return (X) 
 
Algorithm 3.2 computes the exponentiation kP starting at the least significant 
bit k0, and performs an ECADD operation each time the current bit ki is 1, hence 
  (3.2)      
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with probability 1/2.  An ECDBL operation is performed in each iteration. 
Therefore the right-to-left binary method on average requires 
1
2 t ECDBL + t · ECADD   operations.   
Example 3.6 Let the exponent k = 18 with binary representation (1, 0, 0, 1, 0). 
The following table displays the values of X, Q, ki during each iteration of 
algorithm 6 for computing 18P. 
i 0 1 2 3 4 Finally 
ki 0 1 0 0 1 - 
Q P 2P 4P 8P 16P 32P 
X Ο 2P 2P 2P 18P 18P 
Table 3.1   The values of X, Q during the iterations of right-to-left binary method 
 
Right-to-left binary method can be generalized to work with D-
representations.  Algorithm 3.3 is adapted from [18] shows the general right-to-
left binary method. 
Algorithm 3.3  General Right-To-left Binary Method  [18] 
INPUT : an element P ∈ E(Fq ), and  t-digits exponent k  in D-representation 
OUTPUT : kP 
1. X ←Ο   
2. Qd ← dP , 
*d D∀ ∈     
3. For i  from  0 to t-1  do the following 
            3.1  if ki ≠ 0  then  X← ECADD(X, 
ik
Q )  
      3.2 Qd← ECDBL(Qd) , d ( D {0 })∀ ∈ −  
4.  return (X) 
We noticed Algorithm 3.3 precompute all points in the form dP, d ∈ D-{0,1} 
then performs an ECADD operation each time the current digit ei is non-zero, 
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hence with probability AHd(χ).  Since the point d·2iP, d ∈ D has to be added in 
the i-th iteration, all the |D|-1 points have to be doubled in each iteration.  On 
average, the general right-to-left binary method requires 
t(|D|-1) ECDBL + t · AHd( )ECADDc   
operations to compute a exponentiation kP.  Also in this case, additional ECADD 
and ECDBL operations are required for the precomputation. 
3.2.1.2 Left-to-Right Binary Method 
The basic idea of the left-to-right binary method is to successively factor out 2 in 
(3.2), which yields  
t -1 t -2
t-1 t-2 1 0
t -2 t -3
t-1 t-2 1 0
t-1 t-2
kP=k 2 P + k 2 P + ...+ k 2 P+ k P
    =2(k 2 P + k 2 P + ...+ k  P)+ k P
                                                                  
    =2(2( 2(k 2 P + k P )+ ...)+ 
M
K 1 0
t-1 t-2 1 0
k  P)+ k P
    =2(2( 2(2(k P )+ k P )+ ...)+ k  P)+ k PK
                  (3.3) 
Now it is possible to start the evaluation at the most significant bit kt-1, i.e. 
left-to-right.   In the i-th iteration, the intermediate result Q is doubled and if the 
current bit ki is 1, P is added as shown in Algorithm 3.4. 
Algorithm 3.4  Left-To-Right Binary Method  [13][18] 
INPUT : an element P ∈ E(Fq ), t-bit exponent k in its binary representation. 
OUTPUT : kP 
1. Q←Ο   
2. For i  from  t-1 down 0 do the following 
2.1 Q ←ECDBL(Q) 
   2.2  if ki = 1  then Q←ECADD(Q,P) 
3. return (Q) 
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Algorithm 3.4 performs an ECADD operation each time the current bit ki is 1, 
hence with probability 1/2.  An ECDBL operation is performed in each iteration. 
Therefore, to compute exponentiation, the left-to-right binary method on average 
requires 
1
2 t ECDBL + t · ECADD   operations.   
Example 3.7 Let the exponent k = 18 with binary representation (1, 0, 0, 1, 0). 
Table 3.2 displays the values of Q, ki during each iteration of algorithm 3.4 for 
computing 18P. 
i 4 3 2 1 0 
ki 1 0 0 1 0 
ECDBL Ο 2P 4P 8P 18P 
ECADD P - - 9P - 
Q P 2P 4P 9P 18P 
Table 3.2  The value of Q during the iterations of left-right binary method 
 
Left-to-right binary can also be generalized to work with D-representations as 
Algorithm 3.5 which is adapted from[18][23]. 
Algorithm 3.5  General Left-To-Right Binary Method   [18][23] 
INPUT : an element P ∈ E(Fq ), and  t-digits exponent k  in D-representation 
OUTPUT : kP 
1. Q←Ο  (where Ο  is infinity ) 
2. Qd←dP , *d D∀ ∈      
3. For i  from  t-1 to 0   do the following 
     3.1 Q←ECDBL(Q),  
        3.2  if ki ≠ 0  then  Q ←ECADD(Q, 
ik
Q ) 
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   4.  return (Q) 
 
We noticed that algorithm 3.5 precompute all points in the form dP, d ∈ D-{0, 
1}, then performs an ECADD operation each time the current digit ki is non-zero, 
hence with probability AHd(χ).  Also, one ECDBL operation is performed in each 
iteration to double the intermediate result.  On average, the general left-to-right 
binary method requires  
  t ECDBL + t · ECADDAHd(X)    
operations to compute a exponentiation kP.  Also in this case, additional ECADD 
and ECDBL operations are required for the precomputation. 
3.2.1.3 Why Left-to-Right 
From Algorithms (3.2, 3.4), we noticed that both methods require the same 
amount of ECADD and ECDBL operations, but right-to-left binary method 
requires one additional register X to store i2 P . 
In the case of the general methods: 
 1) The left-to-right binary method requires only one ECDBL operation in each 
iteration, while the right-to-left binary method requires one ECDBL operation for 
each precomputed point in each iteration.  This means, that the right-to-left binary 
method requires (|D|-1) times more ECDBL operations than its left-to-right 
counterpart.  
2) The precomputed points for the ECADD step in left-to-right remain fixed 
during the whole runtime.  So it is possible to use mixed coordinates as in [7] for 
the ECADD step.  We can conclude that left-to-right algorithms are preferable. 
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3.2.1.4 Exponentiation with Precomputation 
If there is extra memory, then it is possible to use general binary algorithms.  As it 
turned out, the precomputation of several points is required by both algorithms, 
depending on the D-representation used for the exponent, so additional ECADD 
and ECDBL operations are required for the precomputation stage.  
In general binary methods, and D-representation used for the exponent, the 
number of points to precompute equal (|D| - 1), because the points dP is computed 
for all d *D∈ .     
As explained in Section 2.2 inversions of points on an elliptic curve can be 
computed virtually for free just by changing the sign of the y-coordinate.  When 
the signed representations of the exponent used, the number of points to 
precompute can be reduced by more than 50%, because the points d P  is 
computed only for d ∈ digit-set D and stored in the precomputation stage.   
Next sections present three general left-to-right methods with signed 
representation of exponent.  
3.2.2 Sliding Window applied on NAF     
Sliding window method is an approach for computing exponentiation with 
prcomputations.  It generalizes binary method and is parameterized by a positive 
integer w, where the case w = 1 is the same as binary method.  Sliding window 
method can recode the binary representation of the exponent by such windows 
yields a D-representation of exponent.  In sliding window method there is no 
reasons to force the windows to be the next to each other, fewer windows of width 
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up to w can suffice to cover all non-zero exponent bits if strings of zeros are 
skipped, Moreover, one can arrange for all windows to be odd-valued (i.e., have a 
1 as the rightmost bit).  Then the bits covered by each single window correspond 
to a value in the digit-set D = {1, 3,..., 2w - 1}. 
It is possible to scan the binary representation of the exponent from left to 
right, or from right to left, starting a new window whenever a non-zero bit is 
encountered, choosing the maximum width up to w for this particular window 
such that the rightmost bit is also non-zero. 
Example 3.8  Let k = 221 with binary representation (1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1).  Then 
left-to-right scanning with window width w =3, can convert d as follows 
 1    1    0   1    1    1    0   1    
      3    0   0   0   7    0   1    
 
Hence, yields a representation of k = 221 is given as 0   3    0   0   0   7    0   1 . 
 Such left-to-right scanning or right-to-left scanning yields a representation  
 
it
ii 0k k 2== ∑ ,   ik D∈    
 and the average density of nonzero digits of both representations is equal to  
1
w 1+
 [18].  
Koyama and Tsuruoka [14] suggested the application of a sliding window 
scheme on binary signed-digit representation as NAF to obtain a signed recoding 
with smaller Hamming weight. De Win et al.[33] applied the sliding window 
method directly on NAF giving smaller digit set D ={0,±1,±3, . . . ,±dmax}, where 
dmax is the largest odd NAF consisting of at most w digit equals 
w 11
3
( 2 1)+ −  for 
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odd w, and w 11
3
( 2 1) 2+ + −  for even w.  Algorithm 3.6 describes the sliding 
window applied on NAF as stated in [33]. 
  Algorithm 3.6  Sliding Window applied on NAF    [33] 
INPUT:  an element P ∈ E(Fq), NAF ( , ,..., )t 1 t 0µ µ µ−  of k ,  window  width w ≥ 1. 
OUTPUT: kP 
precomputation stage: 
1. P1 P, P2  ECDBL(P) 
2. For j from 1 to 
w w 1( 2 ( 1) )
1
3
++ −
− do 
            P2i+1  ECADD(P2i-1 , P2)  
Evaluation  stage  
3. Q Ο 
4. i t-1 
5. while i ≥ 0 
5.1 If iµ  = 0 then  
                 5.1.1 Q  ECDBL(Q) 
5.1.2 i  I -1 
5.2  else 
               5.2.1  s  max(i - w + 1, 0) 
               Let l be the smallest integer such that l ≥ s and lµ ≠ 0 
   5.2.2  for n from 1 to i-l+1  do  Q  ECDBL(Q) 
  5.2.3  if ( , ,..., )i i 1 lµ µ µ−  > 0 then  Q  ECADD(Q , P ( , ,..., )i i 1 lµ µ µ−  ) 
  5.2.4 else if ( , ,..., )i i 1 lµ µ µ− < 0 then  Q  ECADD(Q ,- P ( , ,..., )i i 1 lµ µ µ− ) 
 
  5.2.5 for n from 1 to l-s do  
         Q  ECDBL(Q) 
  5.2.6  i  s -1 
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6. Return Q 
3.2.3 The width-w Non Adjacent Form (wNAF) 
 
Blake, Seroussi and Smart and Solinas, proposed independently wNAF that is 
computed directly from binary strings using a generalization of NAF recoding for 
w>2. [18]   
Definition 3.9 (wNAF) A sequences of signed digits is called wNAF iff the 
following three properties hold: 
   (1)  The most significant non-zero bit is positive. 
   (2)  Among any w consecutive digits, at most one is non-zero. 
   (3) Each non-zero digit is odd and less than 2
w-1
 in absolute value. 
If w=2, 2NAF can simply call NAF [18].  
3.2.3.1 Generation of wNAF 
Algorithm 3.7 describes the generation of the wNAF from the decimal 
representation as stated [18].  
INPUT: width w, an t-bit integer k in its decimal representation. 
OUTPUT:  The  wNAF  ( , ,... )t t 1 0δ δ δ−  of  k 
1. i← 0 
2. while k ≥ 1 do 
 if k is even then 
     0iδ =  
 else 
  wmods 2iδ ←   ;  ik k k← −  
  k= k /2 ; i← i+1  
Algorithm 3.7   Generation of wNAF [18] 
 53
3. return  ( , ,... )t t 1 0δ δ δ−  
 
Algorithm 3.7 generates a wNAF of exponent k from least significant bit that 
is right-to-left generation, such that at most one of any w consecutive digits is 
non-zero.  This algorithm uses the signed modulo operation such that k is odd 
each time a signed modulo operation is performed. For example, the 
representation:  
k = (1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,1)                                     (3.4) 
with window size w = 3,  is converted to 3 NAF representation: 
k = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 3 )                         (3.5) 
wNAF have an average density of nonzero digits of 1/(w + 1) for t → ∞, and the 
signed-digit set D = {0,±1,±3, . . . ,±(2w-1 - 1)} where t is the bit-length of the 
binary form of exponent k [18].  In [22], Muir and Stinson proved that the Hw of a 
exponent given in its wNAF is minimal for any choice of w.  This implies that the 
AHd of the wNAF is minimal amongst all D-representations.  Therefore wNAF 
are optimal in the terms of time and memory for w > 3. Muir and Stinson [22] also 
proved the following these properties of the wNAF   
  (1)  wNAF representation is unique except for the number of leading zeros 
  (2)  Every integer can represented as wNAF.  
  (3)  An integer’s w-NAF is at most one digit longer than its binary representation. 
3.2.3.2 Exponentiation with wNAF    
Algorithm 3.8 is adapted from [26] describes the exponentiation with wNAF   
Algorithm 3.8  Exponentiation with wNAF   [26] 
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INPUT:  an element P ∈ E(Fq), wNAF ( , ,... )t t 1 0δ δ δ−  of k ,  window size w ≥ 2. 
OUTPUT: kP 
precomputation stage 
1. P1 P 
2. P2  ECDBL(P) 
3. For i from 1 to 2w -2 -1 do 
           P2i+1  ECADD(P2i-1 , P2)  
 Evaluation  stage  
4. Q Ο 
5. For i from t down  to 0 do 
 5.1  Q  ECDBL(Q) 
5.2  if iδ > 0 then  Q  ECADD(Q , P iδ ) 
5.3 else if iδ < 0 then  Q   ECADD(Q ,- P iδ ) 
       6. Return Q 
 
Although there are slightly more point operations needed to evaluate the 
exponentiation if the exponent is represented in wNAF compared to the [33] 
representation, the required precomputation is less in the wNAF case because of 
the smaller digit set. Blake et al. proved that wNAF is asymptotically better than 
sliding window on NAF schemes if w > 3 [27].   
3.2.4 The width-w Mutual opposite Form (wMOF) 
As we pointed out in subsection 3.2.1 that left-to-right exponentiation algorithms 
is preferable, But all algorithms for generating wNAF, need carry-overs due to the 
recoding is restricted to be done right-to-left due to additional memory O(n) to 
store the recoded string before starting the left-to-right evaluation of the 
exponentiation.  Hence it is an important task to recoding the exponent from left 
to right, this enables the recoding, and evaluation stage in general left-right binary 
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method to be merged without storing the recoded exponent, this reduce memory 
space [27]. 
Joye and Yen [13] proposed a left-to-right binary recoding algorithm, but it 
has been an unsolved problem to generate a left-to-right recoding for w> 2.  
wMOF is the first left-to-right signed recoding scheme for w > 2 that is 
constructed by applying left-to-right sliding window method on Mutual opposite 
form (MOF), and it is efficient as wNAF [27]. 
3.2.4.1 The Mutual opposite Form (MOF) 
Okeya et al [27] defined a new canonical binary signed-digit representation called 
the mutual opposite form (MOF).  MOF is equal Booth recoding but can compute 
in any order.  
 Definition 3.10  The n-bit mutual opposite form (MOF) is an n-bit signed binary 
string that satisfies the following properties: 
1. The signs of adjacent non-zero bits (without considering zero bits) are 
opposite. 
2. The most non-zero bit and the least non-zero bit are 1 and, 1 respectively, 
unless all bits are zero. 
For example the representation 01 0011 010001 0100 , is of MOF. It has zero bits 
inserted between non-zero bits that have a mutual opposite sign. 
 
by (t +1)-bit MOF, and the average non-zero density of t-bit MOF is 1/2 for 
t→ ∞. They proved also that the operation µ  = 2k  k converts binary string k to 
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its MOF, where ‘’stands for a bitwise subtraction.  Algorithm 3.9 shows how 
MOF is computed. 
3.2.4.2 Generation of The width-w Mutual opposite Form (wMOF) 
In order to apply left-to-right sliding window method on MOF, Okeya and Takagi 
[27] defined the conversions for MOF windows of length l = 2, 3, . . ., w, such that 
the first and the last bit is non-zero.  If l < w holds, the window is filled with 
closing zeros instead of leading ones.  These conversions lead to generate 
complete conversion table, for example, the look-up table width 4 is as following: 
01000011   10001000} →→   0030
0110
1011
→


    0005
1111
0111
→



   0007
1110
1100
→


  
 
00101001   0001000}1 →→   
0300
0101
0111
→


    5000
1111
1101
→



  7000
1011
0011
→



  
In general when the look-up table width w is used, then the signed-digit set D 
= {0,±1,±3, . . . ,±(2w-1 - 1)} which is minimal as wNAF.  Therefore, the scheme 
Algorithm 3.9   Generation  MOF from Binary [27] 
 INPUT:  An t-bit exponente in its binary representation ( k ,k ,...,k )t 1 t 0−  
 OUTPUT: MOF of ( , ,..., ) of  kt 1 t 0µ µ µ−  
1. 
i i 1k
µ
−←−  
2. for i from t-1 down  to 1 do 
 i 1 ii k k
µ
−← −  
3. 0i kµ ←−  
4. 
return  The MOF ( , ,..., ) t 1 t 0µ µ µ−  of k 
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requires only 2w-2 precomputed elements.  Now we give the definition of wMOF 
as in [27]. 
Definition 3.11  A sequence of signed digits is called wMOF iff the following 
three properties hold: 
1. The most significant non-zero bit is positive. 
2. All but the least significant non-zero digit x are adjoint by w-1 zeros as 
follows: 
– in case of 2s-1 < |x| < 2s for an integer 2 ≤ s ≤ w - 1 the pattern 
– equals    { {
s w s 1
0 0 x 0 0
− −
L L  
–  in case of |x| = 1, either the pattern equals 321
w-1
0 . . . 0 x  and the next lower 
non-zero digit has opposite sign from x  or  the pattern equals 321
2-w
0 . . . 0 0x  
and the next lower non-zero digit has the same sign as x. 
If x is the least significant non-zero digit, it is possible that the number of right-
hand adjacent zeros is smaller than stated above.  In addition, it is not possible 
that the last non-zero digit is a 1 following any non-zero digit.  
3. Each non-zero digit is odd and less than 2
w-1 
in absolute value. 
The following algorithm is proposed by [27] to generate wMOF.      
       
Algorithm 3.10   Generation wMOF from MOF [27] 
   INPUT:   width w, t-bit exponent k in its MOF ( k ,k ,...,k ) t 1 t 0−  
  OUTPUT : wMOF of k = ( , ,... )t t 1 0δ δ δ−   
1. k-1 ← 0 ; i← t  
2. While i ≥ w - 1 do 
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       if ki = ki-1 then 
           2.1.1 ki ← 0 ; i← i-1  
      else {The MOF window begins with a non-zero digit left hand} 
             2.2.1 ( , ,... )i i 1 i w 1δ δ δ− − +  ←Table wSW (ki-1 - ki, ki-2 - ki-1, . . . , ki-w – ki-w+1) 
            2.2.2  i← i-w  
3.     if i ≥ 0 then  
           3.1 ( , ,... )i i 1 0δ δ δ−  ← Table i+1SW(ki-1 - ki, ki-2 - ki-1, . . . , k0 - k1,-k0) 
4. return ( , ,... )t t 1 0δ δ δ− . 
 
Algorithm 3.10 generates a wMOF of exponent from most significant bit by 
applying sliding window left-to-right and using the conversion table, for example, 
exponent k = 619  has binary the representation  
k = (1,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,1,1)                                                     (3.6) 
with window size w = 3,  is converted to 3 MOF representation: 
k = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 3, 0, 1 )                                            (3.7) 
Okeya and Takagi [27] proved that every non-negative integer k has a 
representation as wMOF, which is unique except for the number of leading zeros  
Theorem 3.12 For t→∞, the average non-zero density of wMOF is asymptotically 
1/(w+1)  [27].  
Proof   The AHd is the average density of non-zero digits of a randomly chosen 
wMOF with bit length t →∞. This density is given as the average number of non-
zero digits divided by the average number of digits written out by algorithm 3.10 
Two cases exist: 
ki = 0 : In this case only one digit is written out, which is zero. 
ki ≠ 0: In this case w digits are written out, one non-zero and w - 1 zero. 
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Since AHd(MOF) = 1/2, both cases appear each with a probability of 1/2. 
Therefore, the AHd of the wMOF is given as  
                       AHd(wMOF) =      
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
.0 .1 1
1.1 .
+
=
++ ww
                                              
Avanzi [3] proved that the Hw of a exponent given in its wMOF is minimal 
for any choice of w.  This implies, that the AHd of the wMOF is minimal amongst 
all D-representations which use the digit set D = {0,±1,±3, . . . ,±2w-1 - 1}.   
Finally, we compare the characterizing properties for wMOF and previous two 
schemes sliding window applied on NAF, and wNAF.  These properties are size 
of precomputed table (i.e. #{ d : d ∈ D*}, and the nonzero density.  Table 3.3 
shows the comparison of these characterizing properties, where SW is an 
abbreviation for sliding window. 
Scheme Table Size 1/ nonzero density 
SW+ NAF [33] w 22 −  
w
w 2
( 1 )4
3 3.2
w −
−
+ −  
wNAF  [17][18] w w 11 ( 2 ( 1) )
3
++ −  w +1 
wMOF  [27] w 22 −  w +1 
Table 3.3 General comparison of table size and non-zero density  
 
3.2.4.3 Exponentiation with wMOF, w >2  
All algorithms for generating wNAF need carry-overs, as result the recoding is 
restricted to be done right-to-left.  In the context of memory constraint devices, a 
small digit set D is even more valuable, because fewer precomputed elements 
have to be stored.  Although none of the preceding methods is a left-to-right 
scheme, each one requires additional memory O(n) to store the recoded string 
before starting the left-to-right evaluation of the exponent product. The 
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advantages of exponentiation with wMOF, the digit set of wMOF is the same as 
for wNAF, and turns out as a complete left-to-right scheme. The evaluation stage 
can be performed left-to-right, and the recoding into wMOF proceed left-to-right, 
this due to no additional memory required for performing the exponentiation, 
since algorithm 13 requires only O(w) bits memory for generating wMOF[27]. 
Okeya and Takagi [27] constructed an algorithm to compute table look-up for 
any w in an efficient way, and less memory usage.  This table enables to merge 
the evaluation stage that can be performed left-to-right, and the recoding into 
wMOF. 
1. Computation Table look-up  
The table computation algorithm 3.11 has to compute γ and ξ which fit the 
equation c = γ*2ξ, and the converted one wMOF δ
 
 is obtained from γ and ξ as:  
 δ  321321
ξξ
γ 0 ..., 0, , ),0 ..., 0,( 
1-w −
=                                         (3.8) 
Algorithm 3.11   Table Computation with Width w    [27] 
INPUT: width w. 
OUTPUT: arrays γ0...tw and ξ0...tw where tw = 2
w - 1. 
   1. For k ← 2w-1 to 3 *2w-1 - 1 do the following 
     1.1   c  ← (k & (2w - 1)) - (k >> 1) 
     1.2   ξk-2
w-1 ← 0 
     1.3.  While (c & 1) = 0 do the following 
           1.3.1  ξk-2
w-1 ← ξk-2
w-1 + 1 
           1.3.2  c← c >> 1 
    1.4. γk-2
w-1 ← c 
  2. return γ0...tw and  ξ0...tw 
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We can observe from algorithm that ξ is in {0, 1, ...,w - 1} which are w 
different values,  wlog  2  bits are required to store ξ and each element of γ is in 
{±1, ±3, ..., ±(2w-1 - 1)} which has the cardinality of 2w-2 and requires w - 2 pre-
commuted points. 
2. Computation of Precomputed points  
Further, the precomputations (2w-2- 1) of elliptic pints are required, since wMOF is 
signed binary representations.  Those points are all points of the form γP, where γ 
∈ signed digit set D = {0,±1, ±3, ..., ±(2w-1 - 1)}, and P is an elliptic point .  
3.   On the Fly Multiplication for w > 2 
Finally the table look-up created in algorithm 3.12 computed and precomputed 
points are used to merge the recoding and evaluation stages for any w.  
Algorithm 3.12   Exponentiation  with wMOF    [27] 
INPUT a non-zero t-bit binary string k, a point P and the multiple of the 
point P, γ0...tw and ξ0...tw, the precomputed table look-up . 
OUTPUT exponentiation  kP. 
1. i  ← t 
2. Q ← Ο 
3. While i ≥ 1 do the following 
3.1. if (ki XOR ki-1) = 0, then do the following 
3.1.1. Q ←ECDBL(Q) 
3.1.2.  i  ← i - 1 
3.2. else do the following 
3.2.1. index ← ((k >> (i - w)) & (2w+1 - 1)) - 2w-1 
3.2.2. For j = 1 to w - ξindex do the following 
1. Q ← ECDBL(Q) 
2. i  ← i - 1 
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3.2.3. Q ← ECADD(Q, γindexP) 
3.2.4. For j = 1 to ξindex do the following 
1. If i ≥ 0 then Q ← ECDBL(Q) 
2. i ← i - 1 
4. If i = 0 do the following 
4.1. Q ← ECDBL(Q) 
4.2. If k0 = 1 then Q ← ECADD(Q,-P) 
5. return Q 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 Contribution of This Thesis 
Chapter 3 presents typical methods for exponentiation, where addition of two 
points and doubling of two points are performed repeatedly.  These methods can 
speed up exponentiation by reducing addition, but the doublings are quite costly. 
This chapter introduces new formula works with wMOF for speed up 
exponentiation on an elliptic over Fp. This formula can increase the speed of 
doubling by trading inversion for multiplication.  In addition, we show the actual 
performance of the newly introduced algorithm and how this formula can improve 
wMOF method.  
4.1 Direct Computation of 2 1n n2 (2 P +Q) in affine coordinate  
On method to increase the speed of doublings is direct computation of several 
doublings, which can compute 2nP directly from P ∈ E(Fq), without computing 
the intermediate points 2P,22P,…,2n-1.[28]. 
Guajardo and Paar[11] suggested increase doubling speed by formulating 
algorithms for direct computation of 4P, 8P, and 16P on elliptic curves over F2
m 
in terms of affine coordinates. Sakai and Sakurai[28] proposed formulae for 
computing 2nP directly (∀n≥1) on E(Fp) in terms of affine coordinates. 
These formulas require only one inversion for computing 2nP instead of n 
inversions in regular add-double method. Therefore direct computation of several 
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doublings may be effective in elliptic curve exponentiation because modular 
inversion is more expensive than multiplication. 
In this thesis we derive formula for computing ( )2 1n n2 2 P+Q  directly from a 
given point P, Q ∈ E(Fp) without computing the intermediate points 
1n22P, 2 P, , 2 P,L 1 2 1n n 1 n2(2 P+Q), ,2 (2 P+Q),L −  where n1≥1, in terms of affine 
coordinate.  This formula can work with wMOF exponentiation method. 
 We begin by constructing formula for small n1, n2, then we will construct 
algorithm for general n1, n2.   
As an example Let n1 = 2, n2 = 1, let P1 = (x1, y1), Q = (x, y), 1 1 1P ( x , y )′ ′ ′=  ∈ 
E(Fp) then for an elliptic curve with weierstrass form in terms of affine 
coordinates ′ ′ ′ ′2 1 1 2 2P = 2P  = 2(4P +Q) = (x , y ) can computed as the following  
1) Computing 14P  as in [28] 
Let 
      0 1C = y  
      0 1A  = x  
      210B  =3x +a  
      
4
2
  0 0
2
  0 0 0
2
1 0
1 0 1
A  =B - 8A C
C  =-8C - B (A -4A C )
 
      2 41 1 0B 3A 16aC= +   
      2  1
2
2 1 1A  =B - 8A C  
      4 2  1 1 12 1 2C  =-8C - B (A -4A C )     
Then computing  14P  = P4 = 4 4(x , y )  can be computed as follows.  
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      24 2
0 1
A
x
( 4C C )
=                                                   (4.1) 
      24 3
0 1
C
y
( 4C C )
=                                                  (4.2) 
2) Computing 1(4P +Q)  
Assume 14P  = 4 4(x , y ) ≠ -Q. Recall from section 2.3, the point addition  
1 1 1P ( x , y )′ ′ ′=  = 1(4P +Q)  in term of affine coordinates, can be computed as follows: 
1x′  = λ
2 - x- 4x                                                         (4.3) 
1y′  = λ ( x  - 1x′ ) - y                                                   (4.4)                                               
4
4
(y  - y)
 = 
(x  - x)
λ                                                             (4.5) 
Substituting x4, y4 by equations (4.1) and (4.2) respectively into the expression for 
λ  we readily find  
2
3
0 1
2
2
0 1
C
(  - y)
(4C C )
 = 
A
(  - x)
(4C C )
λ                                                 (4.6) 
After simplification equation (4.6) we get  
3
2 0 1
2
0 1 2 0 1
C  - (4C C ) y
 = 
(4C C )(A  - (4C C ) x)
λ                               (4.7)                                       
Now let   
      32 0 1T =C ( 4C C ) y,−  
2
2 0 1S A ( 4C C ) x,= −  we get: 
0 1
T
 = 
(4C C )S
λ                                                          (4.8) 
Substitutingλ , and 4x  into the expression for 1x ,′  we find  
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1x′  = 
2
2 2
0 1
T
(4C C ) S
  - x- 2
2
0 1
A
( 4C C )
                         (4.9) 
After simplification equation (4.9) we get: 
1x′  = 
2 2 2
2 0 1
2 2
0 1
T S (A (4C C ) x
(4C C ) S
− +
                             (4.10) 
Let 22 0 1M A ( 4C C ) x,= +  we get:  
                         1x′  = 
2 2
2 2
0 1
T MS
(4C C ) S
−
                                                 (4.11) 
Let 2 20A T MS ,′ = −  we get: 
1x′  = 
0
2 2
0 1
A
(4C C ) S
′
                                                  (4.12) 
Substitutingλ , and 1x′  from equation (4.12) into the expression for 1y ,′  we find  
1y′  = 
0 1
T
(4C C )S
 0
2 2
0 1
A
x- -y
(4C C ) S
 ′
 
 
 
                    (4.13)   
After simplification we get: 
1y′  = 
3 3 2 2
0 1 0 0 1
3 3
0 1
(4C C ) yS T(A (4C C ) xS )
(4C C ) S
′− − −
      (4.14)     
Let 3 3 2 20 0 1 0 0 1C (4C C ) yS T( A ( 4C C ) xS ),′ ′= − − −  we get: 
1y′  = 
0
3 3
0 1
C
(4C C ) S
′
                                                  (4.15) 
3) Computing 12(4P +Q)= ′12P    
Recall from section 2.2, the point doubling ′12P  = 2 2 2P = (x , y )′ ′ ′  in term of affine 
coordinates, can be computed as follows: 
′2x  = λ
2   - 2 1x′                                                         (4.16) 
′2y  = λ ( 1x′  - ′2x ) - 1y′                                             (4.17)                                               
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λ= 
2 
1
1
3x a
2y
′ +
′
                                                          (4.18) 
Substituting 1x ,′  1y′  by equations (4.12) and (4.15) respectively into the expression 
for λ  we readily find  
λ=
2
0
2 2
0 1
0
3 3
0 1
A
3 a
(4C C ) S
C
2
(4C C ) S
 ′
+ 
 
 
 ′
  
 
                                      (4.19) 
After simplification we get: 
λ=
2 4 4
0 0 1
0 0 1
3A a(4C C ) S
2C (4C C )S
′ +
′
                                         (4.20) 
Now let 
′ ′= +2 4 40 0 0 1B 3A a( 4C C ) S ,  we get:  
 λ= 0
0 0 1
B
2C (4C C )S
′
′
                                                    (4.21) 
Substitutingλ , and 1x′  into the expression for 2x ,′  we find  
′2x  = 
2
0
2 2 2
0 0 1
B
(2C ) (4C C ) S
′
′
 - 0
2 2
0 1
A
2
(4C C ) S
 ′
 
 
 
         (4.22)  
After simplification we get: 
′2x  = 
2
 0 0
2
0
2 2 2
0 0 1
B - 8A C
(2C ) (4C C ) S
′ ′ ′
′
                                         (4.23) 
Let ′ ′ ′ ′2 0 0
2
1 0A  =B - 8A C , we get:     
′2x  = 
1
2 2 2
0 0 1
A
(2C ) (4C C ) S
′
′
                                      (4.24) 
Substitutingλ , ′1y , 1x′  and ′2x  into the expression for ′2y , we find  
′2y =
0
0 0 1
B
2C (4C C )S
′
′
0
2 2
0 1
A
(4C C ) S
 ′
 
 
 
- 1
2 2 2
0 0 1
A
(2C ) (4C C ) S
 ′
 
 ′ 
- 0
3 3
0 1
C
(4C C ) S
′     (4.25)    
After simplification we get: 
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′2y =
4 2
 -0 0 00 1
3 3 3
0 0 1
-8C - B (A 4A C ) 
(2C ) (4C C ) S
′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′
                                     (4.26) 
Let 4 20 0 1 0 0C =-8C B (A 4A C ),′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− −  we get finally:  
    ′2y =
1
3 3 3
0 0 1
C  
(2C ) (4C C ) S
′
′
                                      (4.27)       
Algorithm 4.1 shows the general formulae that allow direct computing  
2 1n n2 (2 P +Q)  for n1 ≥ 1. 
Algorithm 4.1    Direct Computation of 2 1n n2 (2 P +Q) in affine coordinate, 
where  n1 ≥ 1,  and P, Q ∈ E(Fp) . 
INPUT: P1= (x1, y1), Q = (x, y) ∈ E(Fp)  
OUTPUT: 4 4 44 4 12 2 2P  = 2 P =2 (2P +Q)= (x , y )′ ′ ′ ′ ∈ E(Fp)  
1. Compute A0 and C0 and B0 
            0 1C = y  
            0 1A  = x  
   210B  =3x +a  
2. For i from 1 to n1 Compute Ai, Ci , for i from 1 to n1 -1 Compute  Bi  
            2 i-1 i-1
2
i i-1A =B - 8A C  
            4i-1
2
 i i-1 i-1i-1i
C  =-8C -B (A -4A C )  
   ∏2
i-1
i 4
i i j
j=0
B  =3A +16 a( C )    
3. Compute the N, V, W, Z  then 0A′ , 0C′  
1
1
n -1
n 2
2 i
i=0
N A (2 C ) x= − ∏  
1
1
n -1
n 2
2 i
i=0
V A (2 C ) x= + ∏  
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1
1
n -1
n 3
2 i
i=0
W=C (2 C ) y− ∏  
= ∏
1
1
k -1
k
i
i=0
Z (2 C )N  
   
′ = −
′ ′= − − −
2 2
0
3 2
0 0
A W VN
C Z y W( A Z x )  
4.       2if  (n > 0)   
   Compute 0B′   
         2 40 0B 3A aZ′ ′= +  
   For i from 1 to n2 Compute i iA , C  ′ ′ , for i from 1 to n2 -1 Compute  iB′  
           2 i i
2
i i-1A  =B - 8AC′ ′ ′ ′  
           4 2 -i-1 i ii i-1 iC  =-8C - B (A 4AC )  ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′  
 
i-1
2 i 4 4
i i 1 j
j=0
B 3A 16 aZ ( C )−′ ′ ′= + ∏  
   Compute  Z 
       Z = 
2
2
n -1
n
i
i=0
Z(2 C )′∏  
5. Compute k k2 22 2x , y′ ′  
               2n2
n
2 2
A
x
Z
′
′ =  
            2n2
n
2 3
C
y
Z
′
′ =   
_______________________________________________________________ 
Theorem 4.1 describes the computational complexity of this formula.  
Theorem 4.1 In terms of affine coordinates, there exits an algorithm that 
computes 2 1n n2 (2 P +Q)  at most (4(n+2) +2) M, (4(n+1) + 2)S , and I in Fp  for 
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any point P,Q ∈ E(Fp) where M, S and I denote multiplication, squaring and 
inversion respectively, and n=n1 + n2. 
Proof The complexity of step 1 and step 2 the same as in [28, Algorithm1]   
involve (2M + 3S)n1 + (M+S)(n1 -1) + S  
In step 3, we first compute
1n -1
i
i=0
 C∏ which takes 1n -1  multiplication. Secondly, 
we perform one squaring to compute .
1
1
n -1
n 2
i
i=0
 (2 C )∏  Next, we perform one 
multiplication to compute
1
1
n -1
n 2
i
i=0
 (2 C )∏ x. Then we obtain N, and V. Next, we 
perform two multiplications, one multiplication to compute
1
1
n -1
n 2
i
i=0
 (2 C ) y∏  and 
other to compute
1 1 1
1 1 1
n -1 n -1 n -1
n n n2 3
i i i
i=0 i=0 i=0
 (2 C )(2 C ) y (2 C ) y=∏ ∏ ∏ .  Then we obtain W. 
Third we perform two squaring to compute ,2 2W ,N  and one multiplication to 
compute 2VN . Then we obtain 0A′ . Forth, we perform one multiplication to 
compute .
1
1
n -1
n
i
i=0
 (2 C )N∏  Then we obtain Z. Next we perform two squaring to 
compute 2Z ,  4Z ,and one multiplication to compute .3Z  Next we perform two 
multiplications to compute 2Z x, 3z y . Finally we perform one multiplication to 
compute 20W( A Z x )′ − . Then we obtain 0C′ .  The complexity of step 3 involves (n1 
-1)M + 9M +5S . 
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In step 1 we perform one squaring to compute 20A′ . Next we perform one 
multiplication to compute 4aZ , where 4Z  is computed in step 3. Then we 
obtain 0B′ . The complexity of step 4.1 involve M + S and the complexity of step 2 
involves (2M + 3S)n2 + (M+S)(n2 -1) as step 2.  
In step 3 we compute 
2n -1
i
i=0
C′∏  which takes n2-1 multiplications.  Secondly, we 
perform one multiplication to compute .
2
2
n -1
n
i
i=0
Z(2 C )′∏  Then we obtain new value 
for Z. the complexity of sub-step 3 involves n2 M. Hence, the complexity of step 4 
involves 4n2 M + 4n2 S.   
In step 5, we perform one inversion to compute -1Z  and the result is set to T. 
Next, we perform one squaring to compute T
2
. Next, we perform one 
multiplication to compute .
2
2
n A T′  Then we obtain .n22 x′   Finally we perform two 
multiplications to compute
2
2
n C T T′ . Then we obtain .n22 y′  The complexity of 
step 5 involves 3M + S + I.  Therfore the complexity of above computations 
involve (4(n+2) +2) M, (4(n+1) + 2)S, where n= n1 + n2.                                         
4.1.1 The Break-Even Point 
For application in practice it is highly relevant to compare the complexity of our 
newly derived formulae for direct computing of n doublings separated with one 
addition and individual n doublings. The performance of the new method depends 
on the cost factor of one inversion relatively to the cost of one multiplication. For 
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this purpose, we introduce, as [11], the notation of a "break even point".  It is 
possible to express the time that it takes to perform one inversion in terms of the 
equivalent number of multiplication needed per inversion. Table 4.1 shows the 
number of squarings S, multiplications M, and inversions I in Fp.  
     
Complexity Calculation 
with n 
Method 
S M I 
Break-Even 
Point 
DECDBL(4)   22 26 1 4 
4 doublings + 1 addition 10 9 5 
6.6 M < I 
DECDBL(5)   26 30 1 5 
5 doublings + 1 addition 12 11 6 
6 M < I 
DECDBL(w)   4w+6 4w+10 1 w 
w doublings + 1 addition 2w+1 2w+2 w+1 
(3.6 w +12)
M
w
 
Table 4.1  Complexity comparison: Individual doublings and one addition vs. direct 
computation of several doublings with one addition. 
 In general let n = n1 +n2, and let us denote the direct computing of 
2 1n n2 (2 P +Q)  by symbol DECDBL(n).  Then our formulae can outperform the 
regular double and add algorithm if the following relation to hold:  
Cost( separate n ECDBLA + ECADDA) > Cost( DECDBL(n)  ) 
Ignoring squarings and additions and expressing the Cost function in terms of 
multiplications and inversions, we have: 
 (2n M +2n S + n I + 2M + S + I ) > ( 4(n +2)M + 4(n+1)S +2M +2S + I) 
We define r = I/M (the ratio of speed between a multiplication and inversion), and 
assume that one squaring has complexity S = 0.8 M[28].   We also assume that the 
cost of field addition and multiplication by small constants can be ignored.  One 
can rewrite the above expressions as: 
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n r M  > (2nM + 8M + 1.6n M + 4M)  
Solving for r in terms of M one obtains: 
(3.6 n +12)
r > M
n
 
As we can see from Table 4.1, if a field inversion has complexity I > 7.6 M, 
direct computation of 3 doublings with one addition may be more efficient than 3 
separate doubling and one adding.  
4.2 Exponentiation with Direct Computation of  2 1n n2 (2 P +Q)  
By using our previous formulae for direct computation of ( ),2 1n n2 2 P+Q  where 
n1 ≥ 1, and P,Q ∈ E(Fp), we can improve algorithm 3.12 for elliptic curve 
exponentiation with wMOF by change step 3.2 of algorithm 3.12 with a new step 
that compute ( )2 1n n2 2 P+Q directly  as in the following algorithm.  
  Algorithm 4.2  Exponentiation with wMOF Using Direct Computation of 
2 1n n2 (2 P +Q)  
INPUT a non-zero t-bit binary string k, a point P and the multiple of the 
point P, γ0...tw and ξ0...tw, the precomputed table look-up . 
OUTPUT exponentiation  kP. 
1. i  ← t 
2. Q  ← O 
3. While i ≥ 1 do the following 
3.1. if (ki XOR ki-1) = 0, then do the following 
3.1.1. Q ←ECDBL(Q) 
3.1.2. i  ← i - 1 
3.2. else do the following 
3.2.1.  index  ← ((k >> (i - w)) & (2w+1 - 1)) - 2w-1 
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3.2.2.  if ( i < w)      Q ← 2 i -(w-ξindex) +1 (2w-ξindex Q + γindexP) 
3.2.3  else if ( i ≥ w)  Q ← 2ξindex (2 w-ξindex Q + γindexP) 
3.2.4.  i ← i - w 
4. If i = 0 do the following 
4.1. Q ← ECDBL(Q) 
4.2. If k0 = 1 then Q ← ECADD(Q,-P) 
5. return Q 
 
In algorithm 4.2, for each window width w of wMOF, Step 3.2.1 performs 
direct computation of  2i-(w-ξindex) +1(2w-ξindex Q + γindexP) if (i < w) otherwise Step 
3.2.2 performs direct computations of 2ξindex(2w-ξindex Q+ γindexP) if (i ≥ w), where 
ξindex = 0,1,…w-1,  γindexP ={±1, ±3, ..., ±(2
w-1 - 1)}. 
4.2.1 Complexity Analysis of the wMOF Method 
In this subsection, we perform an analysis of wMOF method when it used in 
conjunction with the ( )2 1n n2 2 P+Q  formula.  In addition, we compare the 
complexity of wMOF method, with and without formula. Moreover we derive an 
expression that predicts the theoretical improvement of the wMOF method by 
using the formulae in terms of the ratio between inversion and multiplication 
times.  
Theorem 4.2 describes the complexity of algorithm 3.12 for computing 
exponentiation with wMOF. 
Theorem 4.2 In terms of affine coordinate, Let P ∈ E(Fp), t-digits exponent  in 
wMOF, then the complexity of algorithm 3.12  for computing kP requires on 
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average 
(2w+4 )t (2w+3 )t (w+2 )t
M + S +  I 
w+1 w+1 w+1
,where M, S and I denote 
multiplication, squaring and inversion respectively.   
 
Proof   We noticed that algorithm 3.12 performs an ECADD operation each time 
the current digit δ
 
is non-zero, recall from theorem 3.12 that the average non-zero 
density of wMOF is asymptotically
1
+1w
 also, one ECDBL operation is performed 
in each iteration (where i ≥ 0) to double the intermediate result.  Then on average, 
algorithm 3.12 for computing exponentiation with wMOF requires 
t
t ECDBL +  ECADD
+1w
                          
Recall from table 2.2, the computational costs for doublings and additions 
operations in affine coordinate.  Then we can rewrite previous expression as:   
t
(2M + 2S + I )t  +  (2M + S + I )
+1w
                      
We can rewrite previous expression in terms of M, S, and I as:   
 
(2 +4 )t (2 +3 )t ( +2 )t
M   +  S + I 
+1 +1 +1
w w w
w w w
                                   
Now Theorem 4.3 describes the complexity algorithm 4.2 for computing 
exponentiation with wMOF by using ( )2 1n n2 2 P+Q . 
Theorem 4.3 In terms of affine coordinate, Let P ∈ E(Fp), and  t-digits exponent 
in wMOF, then the complexity of algorithm 4.2  for computing kP requires on 
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average 
4( +3 )t 4( +2 )t 2t
M + S + I,
+1 +1 +1
w w
w w w
 where M, S and I denote multiplication, 
squaring and inversion respectively.  
Proof  From theorem 3.12, for t-digits exponent k in its wMOF, if t → ∞ the 
average non-zero density of wMOF is asymptotically 
1
+1w
 and wMOF of k is 
infinity long sequence constituted from two types of blocks: 
1. b1 = (0), length of this block is 1; 
2. b2 = (0
i * 0
w-i-1), length of this block is w and 0 ≤ i ≤  w - 1; 
Then the number of block b2 equals
1
+1w
 because every block b2 has a non-zero 
bit, and the number of block b1 equals amount of 0s in wMOF – the amount of 0s 
in b2   which equals 
         
1
( )( )
+1 +1
w
t w 1 t
w w
- - =
+1
t
w
   
Now, step 3.1 of algorithm 4.2 performs 
+1
1
t
w
 blocks b1 and step 3.2 performs 
+1
1
t
w
 block b2 then algorithm 4.2 for computing kP requires on average  
 ECDBL +  DECDBL( )
+1 +1
t t
w
w w
  
Recall from Table 2.2, the computational costs for doublings and additions 
operations in affine coordinate.  Then we can rewrite previous expression as:   
n
(2M+2S+I + 4(  +2)M +4( +1)S+2M +2S+I )
+1
w w
w
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We can rewrite previous expression in terms of M, S, and I as:   
   
4( +3 )t 4( +2 )t 2t
M + S + I 
+1 +1 +1
w w
w w w
                                                  
Relative Improvement 
Let us denote the times it would take to perform exponentiation by using 
algorithms 3.12, and 4.2 by symbols TRegular method, TFormula method respectively. 
According to theorems 4.2, and 4.3, we can derive expressions for the time it 
would take to perform a whole exponentiation with wMOF as: 
TRegular  method = 
(2 +4 )n (2 +3 )n ( +2 )n
M   +  S + I 
+1 +1 +1
w w w
w w w
     (4.28) 
TFormula  method = 
4( +3 )n 4( +2 )n 2n
M + S + I 
+1 +1 +1
w w
w w w
             (4.29) 
Notice that from equations 4.28, and 4.29, one can readily derive the relative 
improvement by defining r = I/M (the ratio of speed between a multiplication and 
inversion) as: 
Relative Improvement = 
Regular method Formula method
Regular method
T  - T
T
                             (4.30) 
By using (4.28) and (4.29) 
Relative Improvement = 
[( ) ( ) ]
( ) [( ) ( ) ]
wI 2w 8 M 2w 5 S
w 2 I 2w 4 M 2w 3 S
- + + +
+ + + + +
           (4.31)  
In our implementation S ≈ M and r = 12.6, let w = 4, then 
Relative Improvement is 
( )
( )
4 r 29
6 r 23
-
=
+
                                                  (4.32) 
Relative Improvement is 
( . )
( . )
4 12 6 29
100
6 12 6 23
-
= ´
+
= 21.7 %                    (4.33) 
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4.3 Implementation and Results  
 
In this section, we implement our methods and others, which have been given in 
previous sections to show the actual performance of exponentiation. 
Implementation of an ECC system have several choices, these include selection of 
elliptic curve domain parameters, platforms [6]. 
 
4.3.1 Elliptic Curves domain parameters and Platforms 
Generating the domain parameters for elliptic curve is vary time consuming. It 
consists of a suitably chosen elliptic curve E defined over a prime finite field Fp, 
and a base point G ∈ E(Fp). Therefore we select NIST-recommended elliptic 
curves domain parameters in [24]. We implement 4 elliptic curves over prime 
fields Fp, the prime modulo p are of a special type (generalized Mersenne 
numbers) with 2log p =160, 192, 224, 256. We call these curves as P160, P192, 
P224, or 256 respectively.  The parameters of these curves are in Appendix B. 
The ECC is implemented on a Pentium 4 personal computer (PC) with 2 GHz 
processor and 512 MB of RAM. Programs were written in Java language for 
multi-precision integer operations, and are ran under Windows XP.  
We used jBorZoi Library[4] in this implementation. jBorZoi is a Java Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography which implements cryptographic algorithms using elliptic 
curves defined over binary finite fields. We extended jBorZoi Library to 
implement cryptographic algorithms using elliptic curves defined over prime 
finite fields.  Complete code listings are provided in Appendix B. 
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4.3.2 Timings analysis of wMOF  Exponentiation  Method 
We performed timing measurements on the individual k doublings and one 
addition operations and the corresponding formulae for direct computation of one 
addition adjoint with k doublings. In addition, we developed timing estimates 
based on the approximately ratio of speed between a multiplication and inversion 
I/ M in prime filed Fp as presented in Table 4.2.  
Curves Average Timing 
(µsec)  for M 
Average Timing 
(µsec) for S 
Average Timing 
(µsec) for  I 
r = I / M 
P160       7.0   6.9  88.0 12.6 
P192       8.7   8.6 108.8 12.5 
P224 10   9.8 123.1 12.3 
P256 11.9  11.8 145.2 12.2 
Table 4.2   The ratio of speed between a multiplication and inversion in prime filed Fp 
 
4.3.2.1 Optimal Window Size 
To show the actual improvement of wMOF method with our new formula we 
must find out the most efficiency proper window size, where the length of input 
binary form is 160-bits, 192-bits, 224-bits, or 256-bits. Figures (4.1- 4.4) illustrate 
the relation among the window size w, the speed of the evaluation and pre-
computed processes.  We can noticed from these Figures that when the window 
size increases, time of the evaluation will decrease, while time of the 
precomputation will increase, and the optimal w is 4 when the input is 160-bits. 
and the optimal w is 5 when the inputs is 192, 224 or 256-bits.  So all the tests in 
this thesis will be processed for w = 4 in 160-bits input and w= 5 for 192, 224, or 
256-bits. 
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Figure 4.1  Pre-compute and evaluation with 160-bits input 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2    Pre-compute and evaluation with 192-bits input 
 
 
3 4 5 6
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
T
im
e
 o
f 
c
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 i
n
 m
e
s
c
W in d o w  S iz e  (w )
 P r e c om p u te
 e v a lu ta io n
 s um
3 4 5 6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
T
im
e
 o
f 
c
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 i
n
 m
e
s
c
W indow  S ize  (w )
 Precompute
 evalu taion
 sum
 81
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3    Pre-compute and evaluation with 224-bits input 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4    Pre-compute and evaluation with 256-bits input 
 
4.3.2.2 The performance of wMOF  method     
Table 4.3 shows how the wMOF can outperform the binary method (Add-Double) 
by taking the optimal window size w. 
3 4 5 6
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
T
im
e
 o
f 
c
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 i
n
 m
e
s
c
W in d o w  S iz e  (w )
 P r e c om p u te
 e v a lu ta io n
 su m
3 4 5 6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
T
im
e
 o
f 
c
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 i
n
 m
e
s
c
W indow S ize (w)
 Precompute
 evalutaion
 sum
 82
Time in mesec #  Pre- computed  points  
Curves  
Add- Double wMOF Add- Double wMOF 
P 160 27.1 22.6 0 3 
P 192 41.5 33.15 0 7 
P 224 54.8 46.2 0 7 
P 256 73.3 60.3 0 7 
Table 4.3  Comparison of add-double method vs. wMOF method to perform an 
exponentiation 
4.3.2.3 The performance of improved wMOF  method    
Using Table 4.2, we can readily predict that the timings for performing a 
exponentiation with and without the formulae presented in Algorithm 4.1.  In 
addition, using the complexity shown in theorems (4.2, 4.3) and the timings 
shown in Table 4.2 we can make estimates as to how long an exponentiation with 
wMOF will take using both doublings with formulae and individual doublings. 
% Improvement 
 Curves  Method 
Predicted 
Timing 
Measured 
Timing 
 Predicted Measured 
wMOF with formula (w = 4 ) 17.4 18.3 
P 160 
wMOF (w = 4) 22.2 23.4 
21.62 21.7 
wMOF with formula (w = 5 ) 23.8 24.3 
P 192 
wMOF (w = 5) 32 32.6 
25.62 25.7 
wMOF with formula (w = 5) 31.7 33.9 
P 224 
wMOF (w = 5) 42 45 
24.52 24.6 
wMOF with formula (w = 5 ) 43.8 47.4 
P 256 
wMOF (w = 5) 57.3 61.8 
23.5 23.3 
 
Table 4.4   Average time comparison required to perform an exponentiation without pre-
computations stage of a random point in mesc (Pentium IV   2.0 GHz). 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 Conclusion 
This thesis presented several methods which can be taken to efficiently implement 
cryptosystems on smart cards. 
As explained in Chapter 1, one of the most critical issues concerning 
cryptosystems is the security of the secret key which is used for signing and 
decrypting messages.  Due to their tamper resistance and mobility, smart cards are 
a good choice to serve as host for the secret keys and the cryptosystems. However, 
since the computational power and the available memory on smart cards are very 
limited, efficient implementations are needed. 
The first measure to reduce the memory and computational power required is 
to use cryptosystems that are based on the additive group of points on an elliptic 
curve. The main advantage of elliptic curves over commonly used groups is, that 
the same level of security can be achieved with much smaller key sizes, i.e. 160-
bit instead of 1024-bit.  
As it turned out, exponentiation is the most basic operation used in elliptic 
curve cryptosystems. We construct efficient algorithm for exponentiation on 
elliptic curve defined over Fp in terms of affine coordinates.  The algorithm 
computes ( )2 1n n2 2 P+Q  directly from random points P and Q on an elliptic 
curve, without computing the intermediate points.   We have showed in what way 
the formula for computing 2 1k k2 (2 P +Q) can improve the speed of the 
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exponentiation with wMOF. A comparison was made based on notation of a 
"break even point." which is the cost factor of one inversion relatively to the cost 
of one multiplication.  This algorithm can speed the wMOF exponentiation of 
elliptic curve of size 160-bit about (21.7 % ) as a result of its implementation with 
respect to affine coordinates.  
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Appendix A  Mathematical Background 
A.1 Basic Algebra 
We provide here the essential algebraic terminologies and concepts required for 
the understanding of the studies on elliptic curves. 
Definition A.1  A nonempty set of elements G is said to form a group (G, •) if in 
G there is defined an operation, called the product and denoted by •, such that  
1. a, b ∈ G implies that a•b ∈ G (closure). 
2. a, b, c ∈ G implies that a•(b•c) = (a•b)•c (associative law). 
3. There exists an element e ∈ G such that a•e = e•a = a for all a ∈ G (the 
existence of an identity element in G). 
4. For every a ∈ G there exists an element a-1 ∈ G such that a• a-1 = a-1•a = e 
(the existence of inverses in G). 
Definition A.2  A group G is said to be abelian (commutative) if a•b = b•a for all 
a, b ∈ G. 
Definition A.3 A field is a nonempty set of elements F with two operations, 
addition “+” and multiplication “×”, such that 
1. (F , +) is an abelian additive group. 
2. (F\{0}, ×) is an abelian multiplicative group, where 0 denotes the additive 
identity element. 
3. The distributive laws hold in F. 
From now on, F will always denote a field and F* will denote the group of 
nonzero elements of F, unless otherwise stated. 
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Definition A.4  The characteristic of F, denoted by char(F), is defined to be the 
smallest positive integer p such that pa = 0 for all a ∈ F.  If such an integer does 
not exist, char(F ) is zero. 
Definition A.5  A finite field Fq is a field that has a finite number q of elements.  
In particular, for a prime p, Fp is the field of equivalence classes of integers 
modulo p and thus has a finite number p of elements. 
Definition A.6  A field K is said to be an extension of  F if  K contains F. 
Definition A.7   The ring of polynomials F [x] in x over F is the set of all formal  
expressions f(x) = a0 + a1x+ 
…
 + anx
n ≥ 0,  ai∈ F for all i = 0, 1, …, n. 
Definition A.8  Let f(x)∈ F[x], If f(x) ≠ 0 and an ≠T 0, then the degree of f(x), 
written as deg f(x), is n. 
Definition A.9  F is said to be algebraically closed if for every fT (x) ∈ F[x] of deg 
f(x) ≥ 1, f(x) has a root in F. 
Definition A.10  Let F be a field and let V be an additive abelian group. V is 
called a vector space over F if an operation F × V  V is defined so that the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
1. a(u + v) = au + av 
2. (a + b)u = au + bu 
3. a(bu) = (a . b)u 
4. 1u = u 
The elements of V are called vectors and the elements of F are called scalars. 
Definition A.11   Let V be a vector space over a field F and let v1, v2,…., vm ∈ V . 
Any vector in V of the form 
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c1v1 + c2v2 + 
…. + cmvm 
where ci ∈ F (i = 1,…,m) is a linear combination of v1, v2,…., vm. The set of all 
such linear combinations is called the linear span of v1, v2,…., vm and it is denoted 
by span(v1, v2,…., vm).  The vectors v1, v2,…., vn are said to span or generate V if 
V = span(v1, v2,…., vn). 
Definition A.12  Let V be a vector space over a field F. The vectors v1, v2,…., vm 
∈ V are said to be linearly independent over F if there are no scalars c1, c2,…., cm 
∈ F (not all 0) that satisfy 
c1v1 + c2v2 + 
…. + cmvm = 0 
Definition A.13 A set S = {u1, u2,…., un} of vectors is a basis of V if and only if u1, 
u2,…., un are linearly independent and they span V.  If S is a basis of V, then every 
element of V is uniquely represented as a linear combination of the elements of S. 
If a vector space V has a basis of a finite number of vectors, then any other basis 
of V will have the same number of elements.  This number is called the dimension 
of V over F. 
 
A.2 Projective Space 
 
Definition A.10  The affine plane A2(F) over F is the usual plane, A2(F) ={(x, y)| 
x, y∈ F }. 
Definition A.11 Define an equivalence relation on the triples over F, not all 
components zero, as follows: (X, Y, Z) :  (X , Y , Z )′ ′ ′  if and only (X , Y , Z )′ ′ ′ = λ(X, 
Y, Z) for some λ in F*. Then each equivalence class (X, Y, Z) is called a projective 
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point and the numbers X, Y, Z are called the homogeneous coordinates of that 
point. For instance, 1 1 2
4 2 3
( , , )  is equivalent to (3, 6, 8) (use λ = 12). 
The set of equivalence classes with respect to : is called 2-dimensional projective 
space over F and is denoted P2. The equivalence class of (X, Y, Z) in P2 is 
typically written [X, Y, Z] to avoid confusion with affine space. 
Definition A.12 The projective plane P2(F) over F is the set of all projective 
points. 
P2(F)={ [X, Y, Z] |X ,Y, Z not all zero} 
For each projective point has Z ≠ 0, a typical element [X, Y, Z] is equivalent to 
[x, y, 1], where x = X/Z, y =Y/Z.  The set of these points is a copy of A2(F). 
For each projective point has Z = 0, a typical element like [X, Y, 0].  Note that 
either X or Y is nonzero if X ≠ 0, then the [X, Y, 0] is equivalent to Y
X
[1, , 0]  
which is essentially a copy of A1(F).  If X = 0, then the typical point has the form 
[0, Y, 0], which is equivalent to [0, 1, 0] since Y is nonzero.  Thus the set of these 
points is union of A1(F) and the point [0, 1, 0], which is essentially a copy of 
P1(F). This set is often referred to as the “line at infinity". 
Therefore the projective plane P2(F) can be thought of as a disjoint union of 
the affine plane A2(F) with the line at infinity. 
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Appendix B 
B.1  Recommended NIST Elliptic Curves over Prime Fields 
The following parameters are given for each elliptic curve: 
P             The order of the prime field Fp. 
a,b          The coefficients of the elliptic curve b  ax  x  y 32 ++=   where a, b pF ∈  
             
   and 0 )27b  (4a 23 ≠+ .  The selection a = -3 was made for reasons of  
                efficiency; 
xG, yG    The x and y and coordinates of the base point G. 
n              The (prime) order of G 
h               The co-factor. 
P-160:   p = 2160 −2933,   a = -3, h = 1, 
b   =  621468235513391651506736229084534968416800501622 
xG = 915905815259634185505956735251349426573212034266                                
yG =  143158991128202063035631472543963517040298418778  
n   =  1452046121366725933991671292371452349213344743009 
P-192:   p = 2192 -264 - 1,   a = -3, h = 1, 
b    =  0x 64210519 E59C80E7 0FA7E9AB 72243049 FEB8DEEC C146B9B1 
XG = 0x 188DA80E B03090F6 7CBF20EB 43A18800 F4FF0AFD 82FF1012 
yG = 0x  07192B95 FFC8DA78 631011ED 6B24CDD5 73F977A1 1E794811 
n   =  0x FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 99DEF836 146BC9B1 B4D22831 
 
P-224: p = 2224 - 296 +1, a = -3, h = 1, 
b   = 0x B4050A85 0C04B3AB F5413256 5044B0B7 D7BFD8BA 270B3943  
2355FFB4 
xG = 0x B70E0CBD 6BB4BF7F 321390B9 4A03C1D3 56C21122 343280D6 
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115C1D21 
yG = 0x BD376388 B5F723FB 4C22DFE6 CD4375A0 5A074764 44D58199 
85007E34 
n   = 0x FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFF16A2 E0B8F03E 13DD2945 
5C5C2A3D 
P-256: p = 2256 - 2224 + 2192 +296 - 1, a = -3, h = 1, 
b = 0x 5AC635D8 AA3A93E7 B3EBBD55 769886BC 651D06B0 CC53B0F6 
3BCE3C3E 
            27D2604B 
xG= 0x 6B17D1F2 E12C4247 F8BCE6E5 63A440F2 77037D81 2DEB33A0 
F4A13945 
             D898C296 
yG= 0x 4FE342E2 FE1A7F9B 8EE7EB4A 7C0F9E16 2BCE3357 6B315ECE 
CBB64068 
             37BF51F5 
n  = 0x FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF BCE6FAAD A7179E84 
F3B9CAC2 
            FC632551 
 
B.2  Complete Java code  
 
 
package com.dragongate_technologies.borZoi; 
import java.math.*; 
import java.util.Date; 
public class ECurveFp 
    extends ECurve { 
 protected static final BigInteger ZERO = BigInteger.ZERO; 
     /** 
      *  <code>constant</code> 1 
      */ 
     protected static final BigInteger ONE = BigInteger.ONE; 
     /** 
      *  <code>constant</code> 2 
      */ 
     protected static final BigInteger TWO = new BigInteger("2"); 
     /** 
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      *  <code>constant</code> 3 
      */ 
     protected static final BigInteger THREE = new BigInteger("3"); 
     /** 
      *  <code>constant</code> 4 
      */ 
     protected static final BigInteger FOUR = new BigInteger("4"); 
     /** 
      *  <code>constant</code> 8 
      */ 
     protected static final BigInteger EIGHT = new BigInteger("8"); 
     /** 
      *  <code>constant</code> 12 
      */ 
     protected static final BigInteger TWELVE = new BigInteger("12"); 
     /** 
      *  <code>constant</code> 16 
      */ 
     protected static final BigInteger SIXTEEN = new BigInteger("16"); 
    public ECurveFp(Fp a4, Fp a6) { 
    this.a4 = (Fp) a4.clone(); 
    this.a6 = (Fp) a6.clone(); 
  } 
 
  public ECPoint doubl(ECPoint P0) { 
    BigInteger a, b, lambda, x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2; 
    a = a4.val; 
    b = a6.val; 
    x0 = P0.x.val; 
    y0 = P0.y.val; 
    x1 = P0.x.val; 
    y1 = P0.y.val; 
    ECPointFp P2 = new ECPointFp(); 
    if ((P0.isZero())||(P0.y.isZero())) { 
      return P0; 
    } 
    else { 
      lambda = Fp.Fp_mul(x0, x0).multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(3)); 
      lambda = Fp.Fp_add(a, lambda); 
      lambda = Fp.Fp_mul(lambda, Fp.Fp_inv(y0.multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(2)))); 
      x2 = Fp.Fp_add( (x0.negate()).multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(2)), 
                     Fp.Fp_mul(lambda, lambda)); 
      y2 = Fp.Fp_mul(Fp.Fp_add(x0, x2.negate()), lambda); 
      y2 = Fp.Fp_add(y2, y0.negate()); 
      P2.x.val = x2; 
      P2.y.val = y2; 
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    } 
    return P2; 
  } 
  public ECPoint add(ECPoint P0, ECPoint P1) { 
    BigInteger a, b, lambda, x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2; 
    a = a4.val; 
    b = a6.val; 
    x0 = P0.x.val; 
    y0 = P0.y.val; 
    x1 = P1.x.val; 
    y1 = P1.y.val; 
 
    ECPointFp P2 = new ECPointFp(); 
    if (P0.isZero()) { 
      return P1; 
    } 
    if (P1.isZero()) { 
      return P0; 
    } 
    if (P0.x.compareTo(P1.x) != 0) { 
      lambda = 
          Fp.Fp_mul( 
          Fp.Fp_add(y0, y1.negate()), 
          Fp.Fp_inv(Fp.Fp_add(x0, x1.negate()))); 
      x2 = Fp.Fp_add(x0.negate(), Fp.Fp_mul(lambda, lambda)); 
      x2 = Fp.Fp_add(x2, x1.negate()); 
      y2 = Fp.Fp_mul(Fp.Fp_add(x0, x2.negate()), lambda); 
      y2 = Fp.Fp_add(y2, y0.negate()); 
      P2.x.val = x2; 
      P2.y.val = y2; 
    } 
    else if (P0.y.compareTo(P1.y) != 0) { 
      return P2; 
    } 
    else if (P1.x.isZero()) { 
      return P2; 
    } 
    else { 
      return doubl(P0); 
    } 
    return P2; 
 
  } 
    
    public ECPoint mul(BigInteger n, ECPoint P) { 
    ECPoint Q; 
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    ECPoint S = new ECPointFp(); 
    BigInteger k; 
    if (n.compareTo(BigInteger.valueOf(0)) == 0) { 
      return new ECPointFp(); 
    } 
 
    if (n.compareTo(BigInteger.valueOf(0)) < 0) { 
      k = n.negate(); 
      Q = P.negate(); 
    } 
    else { 
      k = n; 
      Q = P; 
    } 
 
    for (int j = k.bitLength() - 1; j >= 0; j--) { 
      S = doubl(S); 
      if (k.testBit(j)) 
         S = add(S, Q); 
     } 
    return S; 
  } 
  public ECPoint[] pre_ECpoints(ECPoint P) { 
    int m; 
    ECPoint[] G; 
    m = Pre_Table.pow(2, Pre_Table.Win - 1); 
    G = new ECPoint[m]; 
    G[1] = P; 
    G[2] = doubl(P); 
    for (int j = 1; j < m / 2; j++) { 
        G[ (2 * j + 1)] = add( (G[ (2 * j - 1)]), (G[2])); 
    } 
    return G; 
 } 
  public ECPoint Im_wMOF(BigInteger d, ECPoint P) { 
    Date d1,d2; 
    long x1,x2; 
    ECPoint Q = new ECPointFp(); 
    ECPoint P1 =new ECPointFp(); 
    ECPoint[] G; 
    ECPoint infinty, K; 
    BigInteger tk; 
    int m, index, i; 
    String s; 
    char n_bits[]; 
    m = Pre_Table.pow(2, Pre_Table.Win - 1); 
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    int tw = Pre_Table.pow(2, Pre_Table.Win); 
    s = new String(" "); 
    s = d.toString(2); 
    n_bits = new char[s.length() + 1]; 
    s.getChars(0, s.length(), n_bits, 1); 
    n_bits[0] = '0'; 
    infinty = new ECPointFp(); 
    Q = infinty; 
    i = s.length(); 
    index = 0; 
    int j; 
    // precomputation  stage 
    G = pre_ECpoints(P); 
    while (i >= 1) { 
       j = s.length() - i; 
       if (n_bits[j] == n_bits[j + 1]) { 
          Q = doubl(Q); 
          i = i - 1; 
       } 
       else { 
          index = (d.shiftRight(i - Pre_Table.Win)).intValue(); 
          index = (index & (2 * tw - 1)) - tw / 2; 
          if (Pre_Table.gama[index] > 0) 
                P1 =G[Pre_Table.gama[index]]; 
             else if (Pre_Table.gama[index] < 0) 
                P1= G[- (Pre_Table.gama[index])].negate(); 
          if (i < Pre_Table.Win) 
             Q =D_Mu(Q,P1,Pre_Table.Win - Pre_Table.zeta[index],i- 
(Pre_Table.Win – 
                               Pre_Table.zeta[index])+1 ); 
          else 
             Q =D_Mu(Q,P1,Pre_Table.Win - 
Pre_Table.zeta[index],Pre_Table.zeta[index] ); 
          i=i-(Pre_Table.Win); 
      } 
    } 
 if (i == 0) { 
     Q = doubl(Q); 
     if (n_bits[s.length()] == '1') { 
        Q = add(Q, P.negate()); 
      } 
    } 
    return Q; 
  } 
 
  public ECPoint wMOF(BigInteger d, ECPoint P) { 
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     Date d1,d2; 
     long x1,x2; 
     ECPoint Q = new ECPointFp(); 
     ECPoint P1 = new ECPointFp(); 
     ECPoint[] G; 
     ECPoint infinty, K; 
     BigInteger tk; 
     int m, index, i; 
     String s; 
     char n_bits[]; 
     m = Pre_Table.pow(2, Pre_Table.Win - 1); 
     int tw = Pre_Table.pow(2, Pre_Table.Win); 
     s = new String(" "); 
     s = d.toString(2); 
     n_bits = new char[s.length() + 1]; 
     s.getChars(0, s.length(), n_bits, 1); 
     n_bits[0] = '0'; 
     infinty = new ECPointFp(); 
     Q = infinty; 
     i = s.length(); 
     index = 0; 
     int j; 
     // precomputation  stage 
     G = pre_ECpoints(P); 
     while (i >= 1) { 
       j = s.length() - i; 
       if (n_bits[j] == n_bits[j + 1]) { 
         Q = doubl(Q); 
         i = i - 1; 
       } 
       else { 
              index = (d.shiftRight(i - Pre_Table.Win)).intValue(); 
              index = (index & (2 * tw - 1)) - tw / 2; 
              for (int jj = 1; jj <=(Pre_Table.Win - Pre_Table.zeta[index]); jj++) { 
                     Q = doubl(Q); 
                     i = i - 1; 
                     } 
              if (Pre_Table.gama[index] > 0) { 
                Q = add(Q, G[Pre_Table.gama[index]]); 
 
           } 
           else if (Pre_Table.gama[index] < 0) { 
             Q = add(Q, G[ - (Pre_Table.gama[index])].negate()); 
 
           } 
           for (int jj = 1; jj <= Pre_Table.zeta[index]; jj++) { 
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             if (i >= 0) { 
 
             Q = doubl(Q); 
             } 
             i = i - 1; 
           } 
         } 
     } 
 
     if (i == 0) { 
       Q = doubl(Q); 
       if (n_bits[s.length()] == '1') { 
         Q = add(Q, P.negate()); 
       } 
     } 
     return Q; 
   } 
 
  public ECPoint D_exp(ECPoint Q,int k) { 
     ECPointFp P2 = new ECPointFp(); 
     if (Q.isZero()) { 
     return P2; 
    } 
    if (Q.y.isZero()) { 
     return P2; 
   } 
   else { 
     BigInteger[] A,B,C; 
     BigInteger DK,FB,RB,BK_2,U, BK_4,BK_S,CK_S,BK_T4,T,T_2,A_B; 
     DK=ZERO; 
     FB=ONE; 
     BK_4=ONE; 
     A=new BigInteger[k+1]; 
     B=new BigInteger[k+1]; 
     C=new BigInteger[k+1]; 
     U=ONE; 
     A[0]=Q.x.val; 
     B[0]=(Q.y.val); 
    // C[0]=Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul( THREE,Fp.Fp_pow(A[0],2)),a4.val); 
     for (int jj = 1; jj <= k ; jj++) { 
             if (jj == 1) 
               U = a4.val; 
             else if (jj > 1) 
               U = Fp.Fp_mul(U, BK_4); 
             C[jj-1] = Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(THREE, Fp.Fp_pow(A[jj-1], 
                                            2)),Fp.Fp_mul(Fp.Fp_pow(SIXTEEN, jj-1), U)); 
 97
             BK_2=Fp.Fp_mul(B[jj-1],B[jj-1]); 
             BK_4=Fp.Fp_mul(BK_2,BK_2); 
             A_B=Fp.Fp_mul(A[jj-1],BK_2); 
             A[jj]=Fp.Fp_add (Fp.Fp_pow(C[jj-
1],2),Fp.Fp_mul(A_B,EIGHT).negate()); 
             B[jj]=Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(EIGHT,BK_4).negate(),Fp.Fp_mul(C[jj-1], 
                                          
Fp.Fp_add(A[jj],Fp.Fp_mul(FOUR,A_B).negate())).negate()); 
          }     
        for (int ii = 0;ii<k ;ii++) 
            FB= Fp.Fp_mul(FB,B[ii]); 
        FB=Fp.Fp_mul(FB,Fp.Fp_pow(TWO,k)); 
        T= Fp.Fp_inv( FB); 
        T_2=Fp.Fp_pow(T,2); 
        P2.x.val=Fp.Fp_mul(A[k],T_2) ; 
        P2.y.val=Fp.Fp_mul(B[k],Fp.Fp_mul(T_2,T)) ; 
     } 
     return P2; 
 } 
 public ECPoint D_Mu(ECPoint Q,ECPoint P1,int k1, int k2 ) { 
     ECPointFp P2 = new ECPointFp(); 
     BigInteger[] A,B,C; 
     BigInteger DK,FB,RB,BK_2,U, BK_4,BK_S,CK_S,BK_T4,T,T_2,A_B 
         ,t,s,m,x,y,FB_2,s_2,t_B,s_A,d; 
     DK=ZERO; 
     s_2=ONE; 
     s=ONE; 
     FB=ONE; 
     BK_4=ONE; 
     A=new BigInteger[Pre_Table.Win+1]; 
     B=new BigInteger[Pre_Table.Win+1]; 
     C=new BigInteger[Pre_Table.Win+1]; 
     U=ONE; 
     if ((Q.isZero())||(Q.y.isZero())) { 
      A[0]=P1.x.val; 
      B[0]=P1.y.val; 
      d = a4.val; 
    } 
   else { 
     x=P1.x.val; 
     y=P1.y.val; 
     A[0]=Q.x.val; 
     B[0]=(Q.y.val); 
        for (int jj = 1; jj <= k1 ; jj++) { 
             if (jj == 1) 
               U = a4.val; 
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             else if (jj > 1) 
               U = Fp.Fp_mul(U, BK_4); 
             C[jj-1] = Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(THREE, Fp.Fp_pow(A[jj-1], 2)), 
                                           Fp.Fp_mul(Fp.Fp_pow(SIXTEEN, jj-1), U)); 
             BK_2=Fp.Fp_mul(B[jj-1],B[jj-1]); 
             BK_4=Fp.Fp_mul(BK_2,BK_2); 
             A_B=Fp.Fp_mul(A[jj-1],BK_2); 
             A[jj]=Fp.Fp_add (Fp.Fp_pow(C[jj-
1],2),Fp.Fp_mul(A_B,EIGHT).negate()); 
             B[jj]=Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(EIGHT,BK_4).negate(),Fp.Fp_mul(C[jj-1], 
                                         
Fp.Fp_add(A[jj],Fp.Fp_mul(FOUR,A_B).negate())).negate()); 
          } 
          for (int ii = 0;ii<k1 ;ii++) 
                FB= Fp.Fp_mul(FB,B[ii]); 
          FB=Fp.Fp_mul(FB,Fp.Fp_pow(TWO,k1)); 
          FB_2=Fp.Fp_mul(FB,FB); 
          s_A=Fp.Fp_mul(FB_2,x); 
          if (A[k1].compareTo(s_A) != 0){ 
             s=Fp.Fp_add(A[k1],s_A.negate()); 
             t_B=Fp.Fp_mul(Fp.Fp_mul(FB_2,FB),y); 
             t=Fp.Fp_add(B[k1],t_B.negate()); 
             s=Fp.Fp_add(A[k1],s_A.negate()); 
             m=Fp.Fp_add(A[k1],s_A); 
             s_2=Fp.Fp_mul(s,s); 
            A[0]=Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(t,t),Fp.Fp_mul(m,s_2).negate()) ; 
            
B[0]=Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(Fp.Fp_mul(s,s_2),t_B),Fp.Fp_mul(t,Fp.Fp_add   
                                  (A[0],Fp.Fp_mul (s_2,s_A).negate()))).negate(); 
            d = Fp.Fp_mul(Fp.Fp_pow(SIXTEEN, k1), Fp.Fp_mul (Fp.Fp_mul(  
                                 U,Fp.Fp_mul(s_2,s_2)), BK_4)); 
           } 
          else { 
              U = Fp.Fp_mul(U, BK_4); 
              C[k1] = Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(THREE, Fp.Fp_pow(A[k1], 2)), 
Fp.Fp_mul  
                                              (Fp.Fp_pow (SIXTEEN, k1), U)); 
              BK_2=Fp.Fp_mul(B[k1],B[k1]); 
              BK_4=Fp.Fp_mul(BK_2,BK_2); 
              A_B=Fp.Fp_mul(A[k1],BK_2); 
              A[0]=Fp.Fp_add 
(Fp.Fp_pow(C[k1],2),Fp.Fp_mul(A_B,EIGHT).negate()); 
              B[0]=Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(EIGHT,BK_4).negate(),Fp.Fp_mul(C[k1], 
                              Fp.Fp_add(A[0],Fp.Fp_mul (FOUR,A_B).negate())).negate()); 
              s=Fp.Fp_mul(B[k1],TWO); 
              d = Fp.Fp_mul(Fp.Fp_pow(SIXTEEN, k1+1),Fp.Fp_mul(U, BK_4)); 
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          } 
   } 
          for (int jj = 1; jj <= k2 ; jj++) { 
                  if (jj == 1)  U = d; 
                     else if (jj > 1) U = Fp.Fp_mul(U, BK_4); 
              C[jj-1] = Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(THREE, Fp.Fp_pow(A[jj-1],2)), 
                                                Fp.Fp_mul(Fp.Fp_pow(SIXTEEN, jj-1), U)); 
              BK_2=Fp.Fp_mul(B[jj-1],B[jj-1]); 
              BK_4=Fp.Fp_mul(BK_2,BK_2); 
             A_B=Fp.Fp_mul(A[jj-1],BK_2); 
             A[jj]=Fp.Fp_add (Fp.Fp_pow(C[jj-
1],2),Fp.Fp_mul(A_B,EIGHT).negate()); 
             B[jj]=Fp.Fp_add(Fp.Fp_mul(EIGHT,BK_4).negate(),Fp.Fp_mul(C[jj-1],  
 
 
              Fp.Fp_add (A[jj],Fp.Fp_mul(FOUR,A_B).negate())).negate()); 
                    } 
 
        for (int ii = 0;ii<k2 ;ii++) 
            FB= Fp.Fp_mul(FB,B[ii]); 
        FB=Fp.Fp_mul(FB,Fp.Fp_pow(TWO,k2)); 
        FB=Fp.Fp_mul(FB,s); 
        T= Fp.Fp_inv( FB); 
        T_2=Fp.Fp_pow(T,2); 
        P2.x.val=Fp.Fp_mul(A[k2],T_2) ; 
        P2.y.val=Fp.Fp_mul(B[k2],Fp.Fp_mul(T_2,T)) ; 
     return P2; 
 } 
   protected Object clone() { 
    return new ECurveFp( (Fp) a4, (Fp) a6); 
  } 
} 
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